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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Lois Robinson's Story
Lois Robinson is a first-class welder.' She has worked at Jack-
sonville Shipyards, Inc. ("JSr') since 1977. JSI owns and runs several
shipyards, where the workers are primarily engaged in ship repair.
Employees describe JSI as "more or less a man's world,"2 or perhaps
1. This and all other in facts Part I, unless otherwise noted, are taken from Robinson v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1491-1502 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
2. Id. at 1493.
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better put, "a boy's club."' 3  In 1986, only six of the 952 skilled
craftworkers employed by the company were women. There has
never been a female leaderman, quarterman, foreman, or superinten-
dent at the Shipyard.
At the beginning of her employment, Robinson did not complain
about the numerous pinups, calendars, and posters of nude women
displayed at the workplace or the sexually suggestive comments made
by her male co-workers.4 She suspected complaints would not be well
received, and feared retaliation. Other female co-workers were simi-
larly disinclined to complain, both because they feared ridicule, and
because they believed management would not make changes or disci-
pline the male employees anyway. 5
As time went on, however, Robinson became bolder. She began
to complain to her leaderman about sexually oriented pictures in com-
mon work areas.6 Offensive graffiti and some pictures were removed
on a few occasions, but were soon posted again or replaced with new
ones. Her supervisors trivialized her concerns, professed a lack of
authority, or promised to "look into it."7 The pictures remained; new
3. Id.
4. Robinson's testimony described "a visual assault on the sensibilities of female workers
at JSI that did not relent during working hours." Id. at 1495. Posters, plaques, photos torn
from magazines, and calendars of nude and partially nude women decorated the shipyard.
One depicted a nude female torso with the words "USDA Choice" written on it; another
showed a picture of a woman's pubic area with a meat spatula pressed on it. Id. Others
included a picture of a nude woman with long blonde hair wearing high heels and holding a
whip, calendars featuring Playboy playmate of the month pictures, a dart board with a
drawing of a woman's breasts with her nipple as the bull's eye, pornographic magazines, and
sexually oriented cartoons. Id. at 1496-98.
Robinson also testified about "comments of a sexual nature" she recalled hearing from co-
workers at JSI. Id. at 1498. Among the remarks Robinson recalled were "'Hey pussycat,
come here and give me a whiff,' 'I'd like to get in bed with that,' 'I'd like to have some of that,'
'Black women taste like sardines,' 'That one there is mine' (referring to a picture in a
magazine), 'You rate about an 8 or 9 on a scale of 10.'" Id. She recalled one occasion when a
fitter told her he wished her shirt was tighter (because he thought it would be sexier), an
occasion when a foreman candidate asked her to come sit on his lap, and innumerable
occasions on which a co-worker or supervisor called her "honey," "dear," "baby," "sugar,"
"sugar-booger," and "momma." Id.
The court also received evidence of abusive language and graffiti on the walls of the JSI
workplace and in Robinson's work area. Examples referred to in the opinion were: "lick me
you whore dog bitch," "eat me," and "pussy." Id. at 1499.
5. Top management condoned the display of photos of nude women, and often had their
own pictures. Id. at 1494. JSI's suppliers delivered advertising calendars to the management
of JSI, and management distributed them among the JSI employees, who hung them on the
walls. Id. at 1493.
6. Robinson's leaderman testified that "at one point 'it was getting to be an almost every
night occasion [Robinson] wanted something scribbled out or a picture tooken [sic] down.'"
Id. at 1499 (alteration in original).
7. Id. at 1514.
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photographs were posted; co-worker verbal harassment of Robinson
accelerated. Robinson finally met with the Yard Superintendent,
Chief Shop Steward, and Vice-President, who told her that JSI had no
policy against the posting of nude photographs. Posting pinups was a
"natural thing" in a nautical workplace.8 Robinson should look the
other way if she did not like the pinups-after all, she had chosen the
JSI work environment. Besides, she was told, the men had "constitu-
tional rights."9 Any rule banning the pictures would be an infringe-
ment on their freedom of expression.
As it turned out, Federal District Judge Howell W. Melton in
Jacksonville found the argument that the men had constitutional
rights to post nude pinups in the workplace less than compelling. In
1986, Robinson sued the shipyard company, charging that JSI had
created and encouraged a sexually hostile working environment. Spe-
cifically, she claimed that the pervasive presence of photos and posters
of nude women, as well as the everyday use of language demeaning to
women, constituted an environment that violated her civil rights
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.10
Lois Robinson won the first round of her case. Applying the ele-
ments of a hostile environment claim of sexual discrimination laid out
in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson," the district court found that
Robinson was subjected to unwelcome harassment based upon sex,
which affected a term, condition, or privilege of her employment, and
that JSI knew or should have known of the harassment but failed to
take effective remedial action. 2 The court decided that the presence
of sexually suggestive photographs and pinups of nude and partially
nude women could support a claim that a workplace environment was
hostile to women within the meaning of Title VII. Accordingly, the
court ordered JSI to "adopt, implement, and enforce a policy and pro-
cedures for the prevention and control of sexual harassment."'' 3
The sexual harassment policy that the court directed JSI to adopt
is a revised version of the policy proposed by Robinson and her attor-
neys from the National Organization for Women ("NOW") Legal
Defense and Educational Fund. It includes a "Statement of Prohib-
ited Conduct" that prohibits the usual range of behavior typically
considered sexually harassing: physical sexual assaults, intentional
8. Id. at 1516.
9. Id. at 1515.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2 (1988).
11. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
12. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1522-32 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
13. Id. at 1537.
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physical conduct such as touching, grabbing, or patting another
employee's body, and preferential treatment to an employee for sub-
mitting to sexual conduct. 4 In addition, the policy specifically
prohibits:
sexually oriented... remarks, jokes, or comments about a person's
sexuality or sexual experience directed at or made in the presence
of any employee who indicates or has indicated in any way that
such conduct in his or her presence is unwelcome... [and] [s]exual
or discriminatory displays or publications anywhere in JSI's work-
place by JSI employees, such as ... displaying pictures, posters,
calendars, graffiti, objects, promotional materials, reading materi-
als, or other materials that are sexually suggestive, sexually
demeaning, or pornographic, or bringing into the JSI work envi-
ronment or possessing any such material to read, display or view at
work. 15
Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc. 16 was immediately hailed
in the national news media as a milestone for women's rights, a
ground-breaking decision for women in male-dominated trades. 17
The Legal Director of NOW's Legal Defense Project, Alison
Wetherfield, expressed hope that the decision would be "extremely
influential." 18 Robyn Blumner, Florida Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union, on the other hand, expressed concern that the
decision might conflict with First Amendment rights to free expres-
sion. "The question is, should this be a legal issue? ... It would be
courteous of her co-workers to respect her wishes and take [the pic-
tures] down. Should they be legally compelled to do so? No." 19
B. The Controversy over Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc.
As of this writing, JSI has filed a notice of appeal, and the ACLU
14. Id. at 1542.
15. Id. at 1542. The policy then clarifies the types of pictures prohibited:
A picture will be presumed to be sexually suggestive if it depicts a person of
either sex who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited to or
ordinarily accepted for the accomplishment of routine work in and around the
shipyard and who is posed for the obvious purpose of displaying or drawing
attention to private portions of his or her body.
Id.
16. 760 F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
17. See, e.g., Amy D. Marcus & Ellen J. Pollock, Judge Rules Against Pinups in
Workplace, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1991, at B2; Tamar Lewin, Nude Pictures are Ruled Sexual
Harassment, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 1991, at A14; Nude Pinups at Work Ruled Sexual
Harassment, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 24, 1991, at B4; Susan Tiffit, A Setback for Pinups at Work,
TIME, Feb. 4, 1991, at 61.
18. Nude Pinups at Work Ruled Sexual Harassment, supra note 17, at B4.
19. Id.
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has committed its resources as amicus curiae to contest, on First
Amendment grounds, the district court's injunctive relief to Robin-
son.2" Although the trial court focused upon whether pictures of
nude women, posted in a workplace, harass women within the mean-
ing of Title VII, the appeal will also test whether a court can force a
private employer to adopt a workplace policy that prohibits expres-
sion ordinarily protected against government interference by the First
Amendment.
Robinson thus raises two distinct but equally controversial ques-
tions. First, is the First Amendment a viable defense against a proven
claim of sexual harassment? Second, do sexually explicit pictures
have such a different impact on women than on men that a work envi-
ronment marked by pinups and girly calendars actually discriminates
against women?
The issues raised by Robinson mirror the broader social contro-
versy over the regulation of pornography, a subject that inevitably
arouses contention.21 Some feminists have argued that pornography
harms women by encouraging violence against them and by reinforc-
ing a view of women as sex objects and second-class citizens.22
Despite some acceptance of this view, efforts to ban pornography have
been definitively rebuffed by the courts,23 and roundly rejected by
most civil libertarians24 and many feminists.25 If pornography harms
20. The ACLU's decision to support JSI's appeal was a controversial one, even within the
ACLU. See David Pereyra, Sex Harassment Case Sparks ACLU Debate, XS MAG., Oct. 30,
1991, at 16.
21. This Comment uses the word "pornography" to refer to sexually explicit material,
written or in pictures, that portrays women in subordinate or sexually submissive poses. It
uses the descriptive terms "sexually explicit" and "sexually oriented" when referring to a
broader class of sexual imagery that includes pornography, but also includes forms of erotica
not subsumed under this Comment's definition of pornography.
22. This argument has been put forth most forcefully in CATHARINE MACKINNON,
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW (1987), and ANDREA DWORKIN,
PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981).
23. See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd,
475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
24. See, e.g., DONALD A. DOWNS, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1990);
Thomas I. Emerson, Pornography and the First Amendment: A Reply to Professor MacKinnon,
3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 130 (1984); Steve G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression: The
Regulation of Pornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1564 (1988); Geoffrey R. Stone,
Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 461
(1986); Nadine Strossen, The Convergence of Feminist and Civil Liberties Principles in the
Pornography Debate, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 201 (1987) (book review).
25. See, e.g., Amicus Curiae Brief of Feminist Anti-Censorship Taskforce for American
Booksellers Ass'n, American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985) (No.
84-3147), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). This brief, written by individuals actively supporting
feminist and civil liberties principals, and joined by The Women's Legal Defense Fund and
numerous women's rights activists, argued against state censorship of pornography. Strossen,
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women because it fosters a particular view of women, the argument
goes, then pornography is precisely the type of expression-the
unpopular opinion-that deserves the strongest First Amendment
protection. In the landmark American Booksellers Association v. Hud-
nut 2 6 opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit used pre-
cisely this analysis to strike down a local Indianapolis ordinance
designed to restrict the commercial dissemination of pornography. 27
At first blush, Hudnut seems to preclude the Robinson court's
imposition of a harassment policy that bans sexually oriented pictures
in the workplace. Under the view of the First Amendment embraced
in Hudnut, even if workplace displays harass women-in fact because
workplace displays harass women-they are protected by the First
Amendment, and courts may not impose restrictive policies. JSI's
defense counsel argued at trial that the Hudnut analysis applied to the
Robinson case, 28 and chances are, the ACLU will also rely upon Hud-
nut. However, although the parallels between the cases are inviting,
this Comment argues that the Hudnut First Amendment analysis
simply does not apply to sexual harassment cases like Robinson.
This Comment contends that a First Amendment defense to sex-
ual harassment in the workplace is anomalous. Employees, for all
practical purposes, have no speech rights in the workplace, due to the
state action doctrine29 and the at-will employment doctrine.3 °
Employers, although they enjoy the protection of the First Amend-
ment, are likewise restricted, by federal law, in what they may say to
their employees. The policies and mandates of both the National
supra note 24, at 223 n.98. See generally WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP (Varda Burstyn ed.,
1985).
26. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
27. The Hudnut ordinance defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit
subordination of women, whether in pictures or in words," id. at 324, and prohibited its
production, sale, exhibition, or distribution, id. at 325. According to the court, "The
ordinance discriminates on the ground of the content of the speech. Speech treating women in
the approved way . . . is lawful. . . . Speech treating women in the disapproved way-as
submissive in matters sexual or as enjoying humiliation-is unlawful .... The state may not
ordain preferred viewpoints in this way." Id.
28. See Trial Brief for Defendants at 44-45, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760
F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (No. 86-927).
29. The constitutional guarantees of individual rights, including the First Amendment,
shield individuals only from state action, generally taken to mean action by any level of
government, from local to national. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch. 18 (2d ed. 1988).
30. The at-will employment doctrine is a common law doctrine governing the employment
relationship whereby the employer is entitled to dismiss its employees, and the employees are
entitled to quit their jobs, for any reason or for no reason, without committing a legal wrong.
See infra notes 80-86 and accompanying text. See generally MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1.01 (1988).
[Vol. 46:403
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Labor Relations Act ("NLRA")3' and Title VII-acts which explic-
itly regulate employee-employer relations-have traditionally pro-
vided courts with the justification for imposing regulations that
infringe on speech, when such regulations are necessary to correct
statutory violations.
This Comment also argues that the Robinson holding that nude
photographs can constitute a hostile environment is a limited one,
applicable only in specific workplace circumstances. This limited
holding, however, has great potential for facilitating a broader under-
standing of sexual harassment, and for furthering efforts to expose
and modify male workplace norms that have hindered the sexual inte-
gration of many male-dominated trades.
Part II of this Comment reviews the current state of sexual har-
assment law and predicts an increase in the litigation of cases like
Robinson in which defendants use the First Amendment to counter
sexual harassment claims based upon generalized characteristics of
the work environment. Part III discusses the traditional role of the
First Amendment in the private sector workplace, in public employ-
ment cases, under the NLRA, and under Title VII racial harassment
cases.
Part IV addresses the viability of a First Amendment defense to a
sexual harrassment claim. It contends that the civil libertarian con-
cern over worker rights to sexually harassing expression is somewhat
surprising given the types of speech routinely squelched by employers
through the power and threat of dismissal. A concern over employee
rights to sexually harassing expression is not analogous to libertarian
concerns over worker speech rights. Rather, the free speech defense
in Robinson and sexual harassment cases like it is actually an
employer claim to its rights to plenary control of the workplace. The
conflict in such cases is not between employee freedom from sex dis-
crimination and employee free speech, but between employee freedom
from sex discrimination and employer workplace control. As between
these two assertions of rights, the employer prerogative to control
speech in the workplace is subordinate to the statutory mandates of
Title VII to provide a discriminatory-free environment. Thus Robin-
son makes no departure from First Amendment precedent by granting
injunctive relief in the workplace to correct the federal statutory vio-
lation. This Part concludes by discussing Robinson's First Amend-
ment analysis, recasting it in light of the preceding workplace free
speech inquiry.
31. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988).
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Part V turns to the question of whether sexually explicit photo-
graphs in a workplace actually discriminate against women. First, it
summarizes the evidence presented in Robinson on stereotyping and
argues that the evidence provides the necessary link, missing in the
Hudnut context, between the pinup pictures and the sex-based harm.
Next, it confronts potential objections to the Robinson holding. It
argues that feminists' concerns over the specter of protective policies
to shield women from sexual vulgarities, and civil libertarian fears of
Big Sister in the workplace are misplaced. It concludes with some
implications of the Robinson analysis for the future of sexual harass-
ment law.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment
The concept of sexual harassment as a recognized legal harm is a
surprisingly recent phenomenon. Before the mid-1970's, victims of
unwelcome sexual conduct on the job did not even have a name,
much less a cause of action, for their injury. But in the 1970's, as
large numbers of women reentered the workforce, feminists trans-
formed women's experiences on the job-employment and promo-
tions conditioned on sex, unwanted sexual advances, threatening and
belittling references to woman as sex objects-into "an experience
with a form, an etiology, a cumulativeness" 32-and ultimately, a legal
claim.33 Since the first judicial recognition of the claim under Title
VII in 1976,34 sexual harassment has become an established form of
sex discrimination in employment.
Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice for an
employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin."' 35  In 1981, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") Guidelines to Title VII interpreted the behavior pro-
scribed by the Act to include sexual harassment. The Guidelines
delineated two variants, mirroring the development in caselaw of a
"quid pro quo" claim and a "hostile environment" claim.36 Under
the Guidelines, quid pro quo claims involve "unwelcome sexual
32. MACKINNON, supra note 22, at 106.
33. For an account of the beginnings and early development of sexual harassment law, see
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979).
34. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1) (1988).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990).
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advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical con-
duct of a sexual nature" by a supervisor when submission to such
conduct is made a term or condition of employment.37 This type of
harassment forces an employee to choose between submitting to
unwelcome sexual demands or losing employment opportunities and
benefits. Hostile environment claims are based on the language of
Title VII that prohibits discrimination "with respect to ... conditions
... of employment." 38 EEOC Guidelines characterize such harass-
ment as unwelcome sexual behavior by anyone in the workplace that
creates an "intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment," or
has the "purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individ-
ual's work performance."39
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,4" the United States Supreme
Court adopted the language of the EEOC Guidelines and held that a
claim of hostile environment sex discrimination was actionable under
Title VII.41 Vinson recognized that an environment that fosters the
degradation of women hinders a female employee's productivity, self-
image, and ability to advance, as well as erodes her professional image
in the eyes of co-workers. An employee should not be forced, simply
because she is a woman, to endure abusive conditions in order to earn
a living.42
Vinson, and the earlier holdings that had first established the hos-
tile environment sexual harassment claim, built upon the discrimina-
tion analysis that had developed in the context of racial harassment.43
Courts had used Title VII to protect workers from a working environ-
ment heavily charged with racial discrimination, even if particular
instances of harassment were not directed specifically toward the
plaintiff and did not result in a tangible economic detriment." The
Vinson Court found no reason why Title VII should not prohibit a
37. Id.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1988).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1990).
40. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
41. Id. at 66. "Since the Guidelines were issued, courts have uniformly held, and we
agree, that a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination
based on sex has created a hostile or abusive work environment." Id.
42. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d. 897 (1 1th Cir. 1982)).
43. The first case to recognize a cause of action based upon a racially discriminatory work
environment was Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972), which held that a state of psychological well-being is a term, condition, or privilege of
employment within the meaning of Title VII.
44. See, e.g., Henson, 682 F.2d 897; Walker v. Ford Motor Co., 684 F.2d 1355 (1lth Cir.
1982); Rogers, 454 F.2d 234; see also infra part III.B.2 for a discussion of racially hostile
environment discrimination.
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hostile environment based on discriminatory sexual harassment.45
" 'Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run a gauntlet of sexual
abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and make a
living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets.' "46
Vinson remains the only Supreme Court case that rests on a
claim of a sexually hostile environment. It held that for a hostile envi-
ronment claim to be actionable, it must be "sufficiently severe or per-
vasive 'to alter conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an
abusive working environment,' "I" and directed the trier of fact to
consider the "record as a whole" and "the totality of circumstances"
in making that determination.48 Unfortunately, the facts and analysis
of Vinson do not make clear exactly what conditions constitute an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.49 The plain-
tiff's charges that a co-worker had fondled her in front of other
employees and had touched and fondled other women employees
were sufficient to support a hostile environment claim. But what if
the co-worker had, as in Robinson, communicated the same message
by talking about women's bodies, referring to them by sexually
explicit nicknames, or displaying explicit photos of women?
Subsequent sexual harassment caselaw reflects confusion and
uncertainty about the contours of hostile environment sexual harass-
ment, as well as "discomfort with the transformative potential of the
new claim."50 The courts of appeals disagree on whether verbal com-
45. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 66.
46. Id. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 902).
47. Id. (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904).
48. Id. at 69 (citing EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(b) (1985)).
49. The trial court did not admit evidence to support the charges of hostile environment.
Id. at 61. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' remand for consideration of
whether a hostile environment existed. "Since it appears that the District Court made its
findings without ever considering the 'hostile environment' theory of sexual harassment, the
Court of Appeals' decision to remand was correct." Id. at 68. For a discussion of the
inadequacies of the Vinson opinion, see Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's
Experience v. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 53-62 (1990).
50. Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1199-1202 (1989). Two questions have been particularly
troubling for the courts, and have resulted in inconsistent holdings among the circuits. First,
when is the harassment pervasive enough to constitute a violation? Second, should the factual
determination be made from the objective view of the reasonable person, the objective view of
the reasonable woman, the subjective view of the particular defendant, or the subjective view of
the particular plaintiff? See Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (1984). Both of those questions are implicated
in the inquiry of whether sexually explicit words and pictures, absent directed overt sexual
conduct, will support a claim of hostile environment sexual harassment.
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ments or sexually oriented visuals, standing alone, will sustain a hos-
tile environment claim. In 1986, in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co. ,"'
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held, apparently as a mat-
ter of law, 52 that the vulgar language of a male co-worker and sexu-
ally oriented posters in the workplace did not unreasonably interfere
with a woman's work performance, nor create an intimidating, hos-
tile, or offensive environment.5 3 Four years later, in Andrews v. City
of Philadelphia,54 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that
the pervasive use of derogatory and insulting terms relating to
women, and the posting of pornographic pictures in common areas,
could serve as evidence of a hostile environment." The Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has explicitly rejected the Rabidue rea-
soning." The Seventh Circuit, on the other hand, fashioned a
demanding standard in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. " for determin-
ing whether a plaintiff had stated a claim, making it difficult for a
plaintiff to posit hostile environment harassment on the basis of words
or pictures alone. 8 The plaintiff in Scott complained of repeated pro-
positioning, winking, physical touching, and degrading comments; the
court found no hostile environment. 9
Until recently, most hostile environment sexual harassment
claims have either been brought in tandem with quid pro quo claims,
or have involved overt co-worker sexual conduct directed against the
plaintiff.' Courts sometimes view quid pro quo behavior (a demand
51. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
52. MACKINNON, supra note 22, at 115.
53. The court explained: "'Sexual jokes, sexual conversations and girlie magazines may
abound [in some work environments]. Title VII was not meant to-or can [sic]-change this.'
• . .The sexually oriented poster displays had a de minimis effect on the plaintiff's work
environment." Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620-22 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F.
Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)).
54. 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990).
55. Id. at 1485.
56. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 877 (9th Cir. 1991) ("We do not agree with the
standards set forth in ... Rabidue, and we choose not to follow [that decision]"). In Ellison,
the court found that a reasonable woman would have considered the conduct of a co-worker
who sent her bizarre love notes sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter a condition of
employment and create an abusive working environment. Id.
57. 798 F.2d 210, 212 (7th Cir. 1986).
58. Under Scott, harassment must cause "such anxiety and debilitation to the plaintiff that
working conditions [a]re 'poisoned' within the meaning of Title VII." Id. at 213.
59. Id. at 214.
60. In Waltman v. International Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989), for example, the
plaintiff charged that co-workers broadcast obscenities directed to her over the public address
system, and that her supervisor urged her to have sex with a co-worker and touched her
offensively. In addition, she alleged that other employees drew sexually explicit pictures and
graffiti on the elevator, and kept sexually oriented calendars on the walls and in their lockers.
The plaintiff in Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988), suffered
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for sex in exchange for job benefits) and directed sexual conduct
(unwelcome touching or "sexual pranks" played upon the plaintiff) as
contributing to an offensive or abusive environment.6' When a case
rests on a plaintiff's proof that her employer conditioned job opportu-
nities on sexual favors, or that workplace norms include the unwel-
come touching, grabbing, or fondling of female employees, the case
need not make clear what kinds of behavior, standing alone, would
constitute a hostile environment.
However, "attitude, language, and pictures"-rather than touch-
ing, grabbing, and fondling-are the work conditions now ripe for
litigation, according to K.C. Wagner, former Program Director for
Working Women's Institute and currently a self-employed consultant
on issues of women and the work environment.62 Although women
have made significant inroads in getting courts to recognize the more
egregious examples of sexual harassment as discrimination, the next
step in the development of sexual harassment law must be to "trans-
formf- the male-centered norms that created . . .the workplace as
women now find it."'63  This task presents a variety of new
challenges. 61
Scholars and litigators generally concede that sexual harassment
law has had less impact on blue collar workers than on white collar
repeated and unwelcome sexual advances. In addition, pinups, sexually explicit drawings of
the plaintiff's body, and a list of sexually charged nicknames of female residents decorated the
walls of the workplace. Plaintiffs in Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010 (8th Cir. 1988),
alleged severe and pervasive verbal abuse as well as offensive and unwelcome touching by co-
workers. And in Shrout v. Black Clawson Co., 689 F. Supp. 774 (S.D. Ohio 1988), the
plaintiff employee's supervisor made sexual remarks to her, offensively touched her, and left
sexually explicit material on her desk. The record showed that "any female subordinate
walking in the hallways of the defendant's ... facility was likely to be sexually accosted," id. at
781, that the work atmosphere was replete with sexual kidding, and that it was common
practice for male managers to make sexual remarks to female subordinates. Id. at 780.
61. See, e.g., Brooms v. Regal Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a finding
of hostile environment sexual harassment based on supervisor's repeated instances of offensive
conduct, racial and sexual remarks, showing of racist pornography to plaintiff, and direct
propositioning of plaintiff).
62. Telephone Interview with K.C. Wagner (Feb. 5, 1991).
63. Abrams, supra note 50, at 1186.
64. Abrams argues that the "next feminist task" is to "reveal and challenge the male-
centered attitudes that structure the workplace" and that "the primary analytic tool of the
assault on exclusion," the "equality principle," is inadequate to the task. Id. at 1185. She
presents the view that claims for equality gain women little with respect to the intangibles that
constitute male workplace norms-acceptable forms of camaraderie, evaluations of what
constitutes a successful employee, prescribed boundaries. Abrams proposes a view of gender
discrimination that combines both the equality principle and a dominance or antisubordination
principle. Her approach would challenge policies or attitudes that contribute to the
subordination of a historically dominated group. The analysis of the Robinson case captures
the spirit of Abrams' approach to discrimination analysis. See infra part V.
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professionals.65 That the numbers of women working in traditionally
male-dominated trades such as welding, construction, and plumbing
remain low suggests that these work environments remain hostile to
women. Studies suggest that for women who do cross the barriers
and secure jobs in male-dominated trades, harassment is less likely to
come from supervisors by way of demand for sexual favors, and more
likely to come from co-workers by way of "sexual taunts and other
actions ... intended to drive the women away."6 6 Thus, if the struc-
tures that maintain sex segregation in the blue collar trades are to be
successfully dismantled, sexual harassment law must begin to focus
on claims that attack generalized hostile environments.
As the claims of hostile environment sexual harassment progress
beyond overt sexual advances to more subtle claims that challenge
male workplace norms, the strategy of those defending the claims is
likely to change. As plaintiffs argue that sexual speech alone consti-
tutes an abusive workplace, or that pornographic or sexually sugges-
tive photos, magazines, or posters displayed in the workplace create a
hostile environment, defendants may begin to argue, as JSI is arguing
in Robinson, that the First Amendment protects their right to the
offending speech or expression.67
B. The First Amendment Defense to Sexual Harassment
The First Amendment has not been a common defense in sexual
harassment cases.68  Typically, defendants argue that the alleged
65. See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, "What's the Big Deal?" Women in the New York City
Construction Industry and Sexual Harassment Law, 1970-1985, 22 COLUM. HUM. RIS. L.
REV. 21, 29 (1990) (arguing that the law of sexual harassment developed in response to the
white middle-class women's movement); Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and
Work.- Judicial Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising
the Lack ofInterest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1834 (1990) (arguing that women in
male-dominated jobs are more likely to be subjected to harassment, and that harassment is
driving away the small number of women currently employed in non-traditional jobs).
66. Schultz, supra note 65, at 1832 n.321; see also Pollack, supra note 49, at 37, 50 n.51.
67. See Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Environment Harassment
and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991). Browne laments that workplace
regulation of offensive speech has proceeded for the past decade without First Amendment
objection, and calls for a narrowing of the construction of Title VII. Id. at 482-83. He argues
that the definition of a hostile work environment adopted by courts in sexual harassment cases
is "inconsistent with contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence." Id. at 481.
68. See Marcy Strauss, Sexist Speech in the Workplace, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3
(1990); J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First
Amendment 1990 DUKE L.J. 375. Balkin finds it "surprising that defense counsel have not
regularly raised First Amendment challenges . . . in the developing law of workplace
harassment." Balkin, supra, at 423. In one of the few sexual harassment cases that mention
the First Amendment, the court noted that a free speech issue was raised but concluded that it
"need not be considered in this case," presumably because the court determined that the
contested expression could not support an action for hostile environment sexual harassment.
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behavior or speech never occurred, or that if it did, it did not consti-
tute harassment within the meaning of Title VII. A First Amend-
ment defense generally arises only when a defendant admits the fact
of the speech and concedes its impact, or when, as in Robinson, the
court makes a determination of sexual harassment and imposes
injunctive relief. Understandably, the First Amendment is a defense
of last resort. However, if the next step in the progression of sexual
harassment law is to challenge behaviors that defendants wish to pre-
serve, rather than simply deny, the First Amendment is likely to play
a more prominent role.69
Sexual harassment litigators may be inspired to use a First
Amendment defense by the current debate over accelerated instances
of racial and sexual harassment on college campuses.70 The First
Amendment has emerged as a powerful weapon against recent univer-
sity efforts to curb discrimination by prohibiting hate speech. In Doe
v. University of Michigan,7 the ACLU successfully represented a
plaintiff who challenged the University's antihate speech policy.72
The district court found that the policy, which prohibited stigma-
tizing or victimizing individuals or groups on the basis of, among
other things, race or sex, swept within its scope verbal conduct pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 3 "The conflict between the left-lib-
ertarian conception of free speech and the progressive agenda of
guaranteeing racial and sexual equality" is no less apparent in the
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 431 (E.D. Mich. 1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611
(6th Cir. 1986). In Jew v. University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. 946 (S.D. Iowa 1990), defendants
raised the First Amendment, once plaintiff had proved that a sexually denigrating pattern of
verbal conduct generated bias against her and motivated a denial of promotion. Rejecting the
defense, the court held, without elaboration, that "[r]ights of free speech and academic
freedom do not immunize professors . . . or their universities from Title VII liability for a
hostile work environment generated by sexual-based slander." Id. at 961.
69. Balkin, for example, predicts an increasing number of First Amendment defenses in
the years ahead, in both racial and sexual harassment cases, due to the "ideological drift" of
the First Amendment, a transformation overtaking the principle of free speech whereby the
traditional "friend of left-wing values" has become ally of business interests and other
conservative groups. Balkin, supra note 68, at 383, 423.
70. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional Narratives in
Collusion, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343 (1991); Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are they
Protected Speech?, 42 RUTGERS L. REV. 287 (1990); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431; Mar J. Matsuda,
Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2320
(1989); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?, 1990
DUKE L.J. 484.
71. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
72. Strossen, supra note 70, at 489 n.17.
73. Doe, 721 F. Supp at 864-66. The court reasoned that an "anti-discrimination policy
which had the effect of prohibiting certain speech because it disagreed with ideas or messages
sought to be conveyed" was unconstitutional. Id. at 863.
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workplace than on university campuses.74 Success with First Amend-
ment defenses to harassment policies on campuses is bound to trans-
late into First Amendment defenses in workplace sexual harassment
cases.
75
The ACLU Sexual Harassment Policy Statement indicates that
the ACLU believes generalized hostile environment sexual harass-
ment claims trigger more First Amendment concerns than do claims
resting on directed sexual conduct. The Policy Statement limits its
recognition of environmental sexual harassment to
where a pattern and practice of sexual conduct or expression is
directed at a specific employee and has definable consequences for
the individual victim that demonstrably hinders or completely pre-
vents her or his continuing to function as an employee .... This
policy does not extend to verbal harassment that has no other
effect on its recipient than to create an unpleasant working
environment.76
The ACLU's support of the employer in Robinson, then, is not incon-
sistent with its stated policy, and may indicate an increased willing-
ness to support First Amendment defenses to hostile environment
claims in the future.
Finally, recent Supreme Court opinions have weakened long-rec-
ognized employee civil rights, signaling a judicial retrenchment
against the progressive agenda of equal protection in employment dis-
crimination. 7 At the same time, legal commentators contend that the
74. Balkin, supra note 68, at 421.
75. Various writers have suggested parallels between a sexual harassment claim in the
workplace and on the university campus. See, e.g., Ellen E. Lange, Racist Speech on Campus:
A Title VII Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 4 S. CAL. L. REV. 105 (1990) (suggesting
an application of the Title VII analysis of workplace sexual harassment to the educational
setting under Title IX); Ronna G. Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65
Tex. L. R. 530 (1987) (same). The campus and the workplace share some characteristics for
purposes of a sexual harassment analysis. On both the university campuses and in the
workplace, sexual overtures take on particular meaning due to the potential for abuse of
power, by employers and by professors. However, in terms of environmental sexual
harassment, and for purposes of a First Amendment analysis, there are important differences
between the two locations. This Comment examines the First Amendment defense to sexual
harassment in the workplace, and considers the particular context of the workplace central to
the analysis. The rationale does not necessarily transfer to the unique circumstances of the
university campus, where the concern for academic freedom carries significant weight.
76. ACLU Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, Policy #316 (on file with the University
of Miami Law Review) (emphasis added).
77. See Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 915 (1989) (Marshall J.,
dissenting) ("the latest example of how this Court, flouting the intent of Congress, has
gradually diminished the application of Title VII to seniority systems"); Ward's Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (plaintiff has burden of showing that employer practice had
disparate impact and that it did not serve a legitimate business practice); Martin v. Wilks, 490
U.S. 754 (1989) (white firefighters who were not joined as parties to suit resulting in consent
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First Amendment is increasingly being used to promote a conserva-
tive agenda.7" The political climate thus points to an arguably inevi-
table application of the First Amendment defense to workplace
discrimination cases, to the dismay of many who value the protection
it has afforded minority voices over the years.
In sum, the Robinson case may well be a bellwether for future
hostile environment sexual harassment cases. For perhaps the first
time in a sexual harassment case, a court addressed First Amendment
issues at length. On appeal, a major issue will be whether the sexual
harassment policy imposed on JSI as injunctive relief violates the
First Amendment.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE WORKPLACE
A. Employee Free Speech: The Status Quo
Although First Amendment defenses are not common in sexual
harassment cases, workers' and employers' rights to say what they
will in the workplace is not uncontested terrain. Most of the debate
over workplace speech pits an employee's speech rights against the
employer's power to dismiss for exercising those rights. In such con-
tests, the employer almost always wins. Other workplace speech
cases deal with governmental interference with employer speech
rights. In these cases, courts have interpreted both the NLRA and
Title VII to permit state regulation of employer workplace speech
when that speech contravenes the purpose of the statutory protection.
In fact, speech rights in the workplace-whether those of the
employee or the employer-have traditionally played second fiddle to
other policy and statutory considerations.
decree that included goals for hiring and promoting blacks were permitted to challenge the
decree even though the court recognized such a holding would be burdensome and would
discourage civil rights litigation); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)
(defendant in sex discrimination case may avoid liability by proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that it would have made the same decision without taking plaintiff's gender into
account); Watson v. Ft. Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (in challenges to promotion
criteria, employer has burden of proving that its practices serve a business necessity, and
employee must prove that equally effective nondiscriminatory criteria exist); see also R.
Michael Fischl, Job Bias Barrage, WASH. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 7, 1989, at 12 (contending that
these opinions reveal the Court's view of discrimination as a deliberate, discrete act rather than
as a complex structural phenomenon).
78. See Balkin, supra note 68, at 384 ("Business interests and other conservative groups
are finding that arguments for property rights and the social status quo can more and more
easily be rephrased in the language of the First Amendment."); see also Lawrence, supra note
70, at 480 (arguing that First Amendment zealotry has "paint[ed] the harassing bigot as a
martyred defender of democracy"); Mark Tushnet, Corporations and Free Speech, in THE
POLITICS OF LAW 253 (David Kairys ed., 1982) (arguing that the First Amendment
increasingly serves corporate and propertied interests).
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I. THE PRIVATE SECTOR: STATE ACTION, AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
DOCTRINE, PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTIONS, AND THE NLRA
In the private sector, employees do not have First Amendment
protection, given the state action doctrine and the at-will employment
doctrine. Under the state action doctrine, constitutional guarantees
of individual rights, including First Amendment rights, shield indi-
viduals only from government interference.7 9 At-will employment
derives from a common law doctrine that governs the employment
relationship and entitles the employer to dismiss its employees for any
or no reason, without committing a legal wrong. 0 The practical
effect of these doctrines is to permit most private employers to impose
whatever speech policies they choose upon employees, and to regulate
those policies with the threat of dismissal. Private employers, like
JSI, are limited in regulating the speech of their employees only by the
narrow range of public policy exceptions to the at-will doctrine recog-
nized by the common law, and by the NLRA.
Common law public policy exceptions to the at-will employment
doctrine guide state courts to prohibit discharge of employees for ille-
gitimate reasons, such as an employee's refusal to violate the law on
the employer's behalf."' Similarly, state law protects employees from
discharge based on the invocation of a statutory right designed for the
protection of the employee, such as worker's compensation.8 2 Some
jurisdictions extend protection to employees who report employer vio-
lations of the law, but even those that recognize this "whistleblower"
exception confine the protection to employees whose report addresses
a well-defined and important public policy.83
79. See generally TRIBE, supra note 29, ch. 18.
80. For an historical account of the doctrine, see Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the
Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 118 (1976). For arguments that the
doctrine should be limited, see Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A
Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979). For a defense of the at-will doctrine,
see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947 (1984).
81. See Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1959) (discharge for refusal to commit illegal act was itself illegal); see also Sabine
Pilot Service, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (employee cannot be discharged for
refusal to dump bilge into navigable waters in violation of environmental laws); Vermillion v.
AAA Pro Moving & Storage Co., 704 P.2d 1360 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (employee cannot be
fired for refusing to participate in theft); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (discharge of
employee for compliance with duty of serving on jury frustrates public policy).
82. Sventko v. Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (employer cannot
discharge worker for filing a claim for worker's compensation benefit that would negatively
affect the employer's insurance rating).
83. For example, an employee may be protected from discharge for volunteering
information about possible criminal conduct of employers, Parna v. Americana Hotels, Inc.,
652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1982), but not for reporting that an employer's research methods are
unethical, Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980), or for reporting
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Beginning in the early eighties, courts began to find an employer
obligation to dismiss only for "just cause," implied from oral repre-
sentations or employee handbooks.84 Employers reacted to this legal
development by inserting disclaimers into their handbooks, and
courts have held these contractual waivers valid. 5 Most state courts
have failed to follow the example of California courts, which have
found an implied-in-law covenant of good faith and fair dealing in
employment contracting.8 6 Thus, despite significant litigation over
the issue, most private employees remain subject to the at-will doc-
trine, and can be fired for any reason-including their speech.
Another umbrella of protection for private sector employee
speech is the NLRA. Under the NLRA, employers must allow
employees to organize a union, bargain collectively over terms and
conditions of employment, and engage in other concerted activities,
without fear of management retaliation. 87 An early case interpreted
the Act to protect workers' rights to distribute union literature and
solicit for membership on company property without fear of manage-
ment retaliation. 88 However, the right has been cobbled with restric-
tions. The solicitation may not take place during an employee's
working time, 9 in workplaces frequented by the public,9° or in areas
where solicitation would threaten efficient operations. 9' Similarly, the
right of unions to picket to publicize their views, established by
Thornhill v. Alabama 92 in 1940, has since been restricted by amend-
that a company's product is unsafe, Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174 (Pa.
1974).
84. See PAUL C. WEILER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 53 (1990); see also Toussaint v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mich., 292
N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
85. See WEILER, supra note 84, at 55 n.18 (collecting cases dismissing employee suits for
unjust discharge where the employer has clearly communicated disclaimer to employee).
86. Id.; see also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443 (1980).
87. Section 7 of the NLRA gives employees the right to "self-organization, to form, join,
or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purposes of ... other mutual aid
or protection." 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988). Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for
an employer to "interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section [7]." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1988). Section 8(a)(3) of the Act makes it
an unfair labor practice to discourage union membership by discrimination in regard to hiring,
tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
88. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
89. See id. at 793 n.10.
90. See Marshall Field & Co., 98 N.L.R.B. 88 (1952) (holding that employer may prohibit
solicitation of its restaurant employees within the restaurant), modified on other grounds and
enforced, 200 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1952); McDonald's Corp., 205 N.L.R.B. 404 (1973) (same).
91. See Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483 (1978) (holding that hospitals can
prohibit solicitation in patient care areas).
92. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
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ments to the Act limiting picketing for recognition to thirty days,93
and by the Supreme Court's rejection of First Amendment protection
for "secondary boycott" picketing.94 Picketing rights were further
diminished by a series of doctrines dictating where picketing may take
place," when it may occur,96 and the subjects it may address. 97
Finally, although the right to engage in concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection theoretically encompasses the right to
speak freely about workplace issues on the job,9" courts have consist-
ently rejected protection for employee complaints viewed as personal
gripes.99
Accordingly, private sector employees enjoy limited protection
under the NLRA, but only for some types of speech in some circum-
stances. Beyond the narrow limits of the public policy exceptions and
the NLRA protection for union-related speech, private sector man-
agement is free to dictate what an employee may and may not say by
wielding the ever-powerful threat of dismissal. °° Private employers
93. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1988).
94. See NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001 (Safeco), 447 U.S. 607 (1980)
(upholding ban on peaceful picketing aimed at convincing consumers of a secondary
employer-one who does business with the targeted employer-not to purchase a struck
product). But see Julius Getman, Labor Law and Free Speech: The Curious Policy of Limited
Expression, 43 MD. L. REV. 4 (1984) (discussing the lack of consistency in the Court's First
Amendment treatment of secondary boycott law).
95. See Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers (General Electric) v.
NLRA, 366 U.S. 677 (1961) (union workers may not picket at gate reserved exclusively for use
by employees of neutral independent contractor); Moore Dry Dock, 92 N.L.R.B. 549 (1950) (a
picket at a common or ambulatory work site is unlawful unless the picketing is conducted
reasonably close to the situs of the primary employer and pickets clearly identify the picketed
employer).
96. See Moore Dry Dock, 92 N.L.R.B. 549 (1950) (picket on common or ambulatory
work site is unlawful unless the primary employer is on the site at the time of the picket,
engaged in its normal business); Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union Dist. 1199 v. NLRA,
256 N.L.R.B. 74 (1981) (finding otherwise protected picketing unlawful because union failed
to file the required 10-day notice required for picketing at health care institutions).
97. See First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (finding that the
partial closing of a plant is not a mandatory subject of bargaining and therefore that the union
may not legally picket over it); Otis Elevator Co., 116 L.R.R.M. 1075 (1984) (holding the
decision to transfer and consolidate operations is not a mandatory subject of bargaining and
therefore the union may not legally picket over it).
98. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
99. See, e.g., Adelphi Inst., 287 N.L.R.B. 104 (1988) (employee who asked a co-worker
whether he had ever been placed on probation was not protected against discipline because he
was not preparing for group action); Meyers Ind., 281 N.L.R.B. 882 (1986) (discharged non-
union truck driver who complained about safety defects on his truck and refused to drive it
after an accident not protected because he was acting on his own behalf), aff'd sub nom. Prill
v. NLRB, 835 F.2d 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 269 N.L.R.B. 881
(1984) (employee who refused to perform assignment because he believed equipment unsafe
not protected because none of the other employees had complained).
100. Unions generally bargain for "just cause" provisions in the employment contract,
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may fire workers for disparaging the company's product, 1°' for exam-
ple, or for using derogatory and insulting language towards a supervi-
sor,10 2 with impunity.
2. PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: THE FIRST AMENDMENT, ISSUES OF
PUBLIC CONCERN, AND EMPLOYER CONTROL
In the public sector, where the employer is the government,
employees do have First Amendment rights. Early public workplace
speech cases recognized that "[s]peech about 'the manner in which
government is operated or should be operated' is an essential part of
the communications necessary for self-governance the protection of
which was a central purpose of the First Amendment."'0 3 Pickering
v. Board of Education " 4 set out the test for determining whether
employee speech should enjoy First Amendment protection: a bal-
ance is to be struck "between the interests of the [employee], as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the inter-
est of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees."'' 05 In practice, the
government-as-employer's interest in workplace efficiency and disci-
pline has almost always proven, in the Pickering balance test, to carry
more weight than an employee's free speech rights.10 6
Connick v. Meyers 07 further limited the scope of an employee's
free speech rights by delineating between speech that addresses a pub-
lic concern and speech characterized as a matter of personal interest.
The First Amendment protects the former type of speech, as long as
protection is not denied under Pickering as disruptive of the work-
place. However, when the speech addresses a matter of personal
which may effectively prohibit discharges based on speech. See WEILER, supra note 84, at 50.
However, any rights derived from the collective bargain are contractual, not statutory, in
nature.
101. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1299, Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers, 346 U.S. 464 (1953)
(upholding discharge of employees who distributed handbills criticizing the Jefferson Standard
Broadcasting Company for poor quality programming, insufficient equipment, and "second-
class" service).
102. See Sullair P.T.O., Inc. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 500, 503 (7th Cir. 1981) (upholding
discharge of employee who shouted "vulgar and obscene words of sexual connotation" at
management).
103. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
104. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
105. Id. at 568.
106. See Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector
Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 3, 8-25 & nn.96-97 (1987) (collecting cases). As Massaro
points out, "[A]ssumptions about broad freedom of speech within the public sector workplace
are mistaken." Id. at 4.
107. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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interest to the employee, the Court noted that "government officials
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."' 10 8
Consequently, although the background assumption is that pub-
lic employees have free speech rights that can be overcome only where
the government's interest as employer is quite strong, just the opposite
turns out to be true in practice.109 An employee may not say anything
that her employer believes might disrupt the efficiency of delivery of
public services unless an overwhelming public interest is at stake,
unpolluted by any personal interest on the part of the employee. Even
if an employee proves that she was discharged because of speech of
public concern, an employer will still prevail if it can prove, by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that it would have fired her anyway.
11°
In public employment, in other words, there is but a narrow First
Amendment "public concern" exception to the otherwise almost uni-
versal understanding that in the workplace, employees speak freely at
their peril.
B. Employer Free Speech: The Status Quo
Although in practice neither private nor public employees enjoy
significant First Amendment protection against retaliatory dismissal,
the First Amendment does protect employers against government
interference. Still, that protection does not trump all other workplace
rights. Both the NLRA and Title VII limit employer's free speech
rights and employer's rights to control employee speech in the
workplace.
108. Id. at 146. For a discussion of the implications of and rationale behind Connick's
distinction between public concern and personal interest speech, see R. Michael Fischl, Labor,
Management, and the First Amendment: Whose Rights are These, Anyway?, 10 CARDOZO L.
REV. 729 (1989). The purported distinction is, at best, a difficult one. Id. at 736. Fischl
contends that courts are reading Connick as a "de facto labor exemption from First
Amendment protection," id. at 737, and that the constitutional norms of free speech almost
invariably give way to underlying political and cultural assumptions about labor relations. Id.
109. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990). Estlund collects
cases demonstrating courts' use of the Connick public concern test to summarily dismiss public
employee's free speech claims. Id. at 37 n.218. These cases include claims for improper
discharge of a day care center employee for protesting the use of corporal punishment, Moore
v. Mississippi Valley State Univ., 871 F.2d 545 (5th.Cir. 1989), and of a police officer for his
criticisms of the administration of an emergency response unit, Brown v. City of Trenton, 867
F.2d 318 (6th Cir. 1989). See also Massaro, supra note 106, at 18 (discussing additional
obstacles to employee's success on a free speech claim, including the Supreme Court's
procedural due process decisions and the "good faith defense" in section 1983 cases).
110. See Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1976).
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1. NLRA RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYER SPEECH
The NLRA, while assuring employees protection against retalia-
tion for some union organizing speech, also restricts employer speech.
The seminal case of NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. "I' held that employer
speech that constituted unfair labor practice under the Act did not
enjoy First Amendment protection. An employer, said the Court, "is
free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about
unionism.., so long as the communications do not contain a 'threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.' 1112 But if the employer's
statements to the employees imply any threat of retaliation, that
speech is "without the protection of the First Amendment.,," 3 The
Gissel Court considered the context of the labor setting essential in
assessing the employer's expression as an unfair labor practice.
According to the Court, "any balancing of [the employee's rights]
must take into account the economic dependence of the employees on
their employers.""1I4
Gissel, of course, did not resolve the issue of which employer's
statements constitute threats, and which are simply predictions of
possible economic consequences of unionization. Subsequent cases
vary in their distinction between threats and predictions, and the lati-
tude they give employers to discuss the possible harmful effects of
unionization.'I ' Nevertheless, it remains well settled that overt
threats of economic retaliation are not an exercise of free speech, but
are interferences with the right of self-organization protected by sec-
tion 7 of the NLRA.116 When employer speech constitutes a violation
of the NLRA, the First Amendment simply does not protect it.
Cases interpreting the NLRA restrict employer speech in a vari-
ety of other ways. The Act prohibits employers from making any
speech to a large group of employees on company premises within
twenty-four hours of a scheduled election, 1 7 questioning employees
about their union allegiance without certain safeguards,"' making
111. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
112. Id. at 618.
113. Id. at 619. The speech at issue in Gissel was that of an employer who argued that the
union was strike-happy, and warned that a strike could lead to economic woes for the
company and the closing of the plant.
114. Id. at 617.
115. See JULIUS G. GETMAN & BERTRAND B. POGREBIN, LABOR RELATIONS: THE BASIC
PROCESSES, LAW AND PRACTICE 50-51 (1988). The results are inconsistent, according to
Getman, because "the cases vary so much in tone and detail while the adjudicators are almost
certain to vary in attitude, bias, and assumption." Id. at 51.
116. See, e.g., NLRB v. Alco Mining Co., 425 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1970).
117. Peerless Plywood Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 427, 429 (1953).
118. Thomas Indus. v. NLRB, 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982); NLRB v. A.W. Thompson,
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campaign appeals or arguments that "inflame the racial feelings of
voters,"" 9 discussing the union with small groups of employees away
from the employees' work stations 20 or in employee's homes,121 and
offering benefits to employees during a union organizing campaign.1 22
Employers, then, like employees, are not completely unrestricted
in what they may say and how they may say it. The NLRA repre-
sents a congressional determination that in certain contexts, the goals
sought by the statutory scheme render workplace regulations that
affect employer speech rights beyond the reach of the First
Amendment.
2. TITLE VII RESTRICTIONS ON EMPLOYER SPEECH
Another line of caselaw supports the notion that the First
Amendment does not shield employers from state imposition of work-
place speech regulations. Courts have recognized racial harassment
hostile environment claims under Title VII since 1971.123 The First
Amendment has not impeded courts' imposition of injunctive reme-
dies upon employers in racial discrimination cases. 124
Inc., 651 F.2d 1141 (5th Cir. 1981). The guidelines required are set out in Stuksnes Constr.
Co., 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967).
119. Sewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 70-71 (1962).
120. People's Drug Stores Inc., 119 N.L.R.B. 634 (1957) (setting aside an election on the
basis of the employer's interviewing employees in small groups away from their normal work
places). But see NVF Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 663 (1974) (rejecting the per se approach of People's
Drug Stores and substituting an inquiry into all the facts in a particular case to determine
whether, given the size of the groups interviewed, the locus of the interview, the position of the
interviewer in the employer's hierarchy, and the tenor of the speaker's remarks, the discussions
at issue were coercive).
121. Peoria Plastics Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 545, 547 (1957); The Hurley Company, Inc., 130
N.L.R.B. 282 (1961).
122. NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405 (1964).
123. Rogers v. Equal Opportunity Comm'n, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 406
U.S. 957 (1972).
124. See, e.g., EEOC v. Beverage Canners, Inc., 897 F.2d 1967 (11 th Cir. 1990) (upholding
both the finding of a racially hostile environment where plant supervisors frequently made
inflammatory, racially derogatory remarks in the presence of black employees, and the
imposition of injunctive relief); Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989) (holding that Title VII requires. employer to "take prompt
action to prevent bigots from expressing their opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-
workers"); Harris v. International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509 (D. Me. 1991) (finding
racially hostile environment and directing employer to implement 5 programs immediately to
remedy the Title VII violation); Ways v. City of Lincoln, 705 F. Supp. 1420, 1423 (D. Neb.
1988) (finding a racially hostile environment and imposing an injunction which required chief
to form "plan for taking decisive action toward eliminating the racially hostile work
environment" subject to court approval); Butler v. Coral Volkswagen, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1034,
1041-42 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (finding a hostile environment and permanently enjoining employer
from discrimination on the basis of race by requiring that managerial staff attend training cases
for human resource development, that manager raise the subject of racial harassment and
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Race discrimination cases parallel sexual harassment cases in a
number of ways. In each, litigants first attacked employers' overt
denials of employment to minorities or women based upon race or
sex. Later it became necessary, to further the goals of Title VII, to
attack the more subtle means of discrimination that kept minorities
and women out of certain workplaces or positions. Rogers v. Equal
Opportunity Commission, 25 which established the hostile environ-
ment race claim under Title VII, recognized that employment dis-
crimination is a "complex and pervasive phenomenon" and that
employers will "undoubtedly devise more sophisticated methods to
perpetuate discrimination" as patently discriminatory practices are
outlawed.1 26 Tacit approval of employee conduct that antagonizes
and alienates minorities or women may well further an employer's
inclinations to subvert the demands of Title VII. In recognition of
this dynamic, courts hold employers responsible for the discrimina-
tory conduct or expression of their employees where the employer
knew or should have known of it, and failed to take adequate meas-
ures to eliminate it. 127 In other words, courts have considered the
conduct and expression indicted in racially hostile environment cases
to be as much that of the employer as the employee.
Snell v. Suffolk County128 provides an enlightening analysis of
the racially hostile environment claim under Title VII. In Snell,
Black and Hispanic correction officers established a Title VII viola-
tion by showing that fellow officers had subjected them to verbal and
other abuse. The court found that "[d]emeaning epithets [had] been
regularly used ... [s]currilous statements and cartoons [were] often
posted on official bulletin boards .... [and] [p]laintiffs [had] repeat-
edly been mimicked in derogatory ways." 129
discrimination with all employees, and that the judicial order be posted conspicuously in
defendant's workplace). Although in each of these cases the injunctive relief involved some
regulation of speech, in no instance was the First Amendment a bar.
125. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
126. Id. at 238-39.
127. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469 (3rd Cir. 1990) (holding that
under Title VII, liability exists where defendant had actual or constructive knowledge of
sexually hostile environment); Lopez v. S.B. Thomas, Inc., 831 F.2d 1184 (2nd Cir. 1987)
(holding that Title VII prohibits an employer from standing by when the employer knows or
reasonably should know that co-workers are harassing. an employee because of that
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
128. 611 F. Supp. 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
129. Id. at 525. "Jokes" circulating in the office included a fake minority officer civil service
exam study guide with a decidedly racist cast, cartoons depicting a Klu Klux Klan member
who had just shot a black person being remonstrated for hunting "out of season," pictures of
naked black people with the caption "official runnin' Nigger Target," and a Klu Klux Klan
application. Id.
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The Snell court considered two arguments common to racial and
sexual discrimination cases: first, that the prejudice displayed in the
office was no greater than that displayed in society in general; and
second, that Congress did not intend the ban on workplace discrimi-
nation to extend to joking. The court dispensed with the first argu-
ment in short order. While taking judicial notice that prejudicial
language pervaded the state and county where the case was brought,
the court considered it axiomatic that courts "not become involved in
policing what citizens say and do in their homes and at social gather-
ings." 130 But "[tihe workplace is different because it is governed by
Congress's mandate that discrimination in employment will no longer
be tolerated in this country."'' 31
In dealing with the second argument, that eradicating racial and
ethnic joking was not what Congress had in mind in enacting Title
VII, the court drew upon a solid body of sociological literature on the
effects of racial jokes. The court recognized that racially stereotyped
rough humor serves a variety of purposes. It can provide ventilation
for suppressed hostility and fear, disguise affection, displace aggres-
sion, protect self-esteem, and define self-image. But the court con-
cluded that the particular pattern of ethnic jokes in the Suffolk
County Jail was designed to demean, harass, and intimidate. That,
the court said, it could not tolerate because "Congress has flatly ruled
that it will not be allowed in the workplace." 132
The court's remedy in Snell is similar to the one adopted in
Robinson: the imposition of a workplace policy prohibiting the partic-
ular behavior that created the hostile environment. The policy for-
bade the use of certain epithets (nine of which were specifically listed),
the posting or distribution of derogatory cartoons or written materi-
als, and racial, ethnic, and religious slurs in the form of jokes.
Most important, Snell held that "the First Amendment does not
bar appropriate relief in the instant case of discrimination in the
workplace."13 3  Title VII imposed an affirmative duty upon the
130. Id. at 528.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 531.
133. Snell, 611 F. Supp. at 531. The court declined to elaborate on this point, stating
merely that the reasons were "beyond the scope of this opinion," and that it would be
"inappropriate" to address the issue because neither party had raised it. Id. What the court
did consider "appropriate" were "strong remedial steps ... in the instant case." Id. The court
here stood on solid ground. "Where racial discrimination is concerned, the [district] court has
not merely the power but the duty to render a decree which will so far as possible eliminate the
discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in the future." Harris v.
International Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1527 (D. Me. 1991) (quoting Albemarle Paper Co.
v Moody, 422 U.S. at 418 (1975)) (imposing affirmative relief by ordering defendant to train
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employer to provide a workplace free from harassment which the
employer could not circumvent by tacit approval of racist workplace
language and attitudes, and an assertion of First Amendment rights.
IV. THE FIRST AMENDMENT DEFENSE TO SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH OR
EMPLOYER CONTROL?
A. Employee Free Speech and the Sexual Harassment Case
The preceding Part argued that in both private and public sector
workplaces, employee speech is, with rare exception, a matter of
employer prerogative. The ACLU's concern over worker speech con-
strained by sexual harassment policies, then, is peculiar in the face of
the lack of First Amendment protection generally afforded workers.
The ready response to this declaration is, of course, that just because
employees currently enjoy little protection for their speech is no rea-
son to further limit that protection by disallowing sexual or sexist
expression. Better perhaps to expand the exceptions to the at-will and
state action doctrines, or to change the judicial application of the
Pickering/Connick balance test to include a broader category of
speech.
The argument that public and private employees currently enjoy
minimal speech rights is not meant to endorse the at-will employment
doctrine as a means of prohibiting employee speech, or to approve of
the poverty of First Amendment protection for public employees or
union members. Rather, this Comment, as a preliminary matter,
questions why the speech in Robinson should merit more or different
First Amendment concern than other workplace speech that is tradi-
tionally unprotected.
Within the workplace, courts recognize an employee's First
Amendment rights when they perceive a threat to a right separate and
distinct from the simple right to express oneself. In the private sector,
and educate supervisors and employees on issues of harassment and to adopt formal grievance
procedures); accord Johnson v. Brock, 810 F.2d 219, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (holding that
district court must exercise its discretion in light of the prophylactic purposes of [Title VII] to
ensure that discrimination does not recur). Injunctive relief is considered appropriate in racial
discrimination cases, unless there is no reasonable expectation that the discrimination will
continue or recur. See Spencer v. General Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 651 (4th Cir. 1990) (declining to
impose injunction only because there was no danger of recurrence since harassment involved
isolated incident, offending supervisor had been fired, plaintiff had been transferred, and
company had instituted a sexual harassment policy). Nor is an injunction an unusual remedy.
See, e.g., Jew v. University of Iowa, 749 F. Supp. (S.D. Iowa 1990) (ordering promotion of
plaintiff who was denied full professorship because of bias generated by sexually harassing
hostile work environment).
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the law honors an employee's speech rights only when denying them
would force her to break the law. In public employment cases, courts
protect employees' speech rights on matters of public concern only to
preserve communication necessary to self-governance and democracy
(in the state, rather than within the workplace). And in labor cases,
the law protects the employee's speech rights only from threats to the
statutory right to unionize and bargain collectively. But in Robinson,
no right of the workers-beyond the simple desire to express them-
selves through the posting of pinups-is at issue. As dear as this right
of self-expression may be, no work-related right and no state-sanc-
tioned instrumental goal is frustrated by demanding that, in the work-
place, Playboy playmates are off-limits.
On the other hand, a specific workplace right is furthered by a
policy that prohibits discriminatory behavior, including speech. The
injunction granting relief to Lois Robinson by imposing the sexual
harassment policy on JSI gives meaning to her rights under Title VII.
Therefore, it is not inconsistent to support broader worker free
speech in the public employment cases and worker empowerment in
the labor cases, and also support a court-imposed regulation that pro-
hibits some employee speech in sexual harassment cases. In both pub-
lic employment and labor cases, a concept of fundamental fairness
between employer and employee constrains the employer's built-in
control over the employee's speech, and balances an inherently une-
qual power dynamic. But in sexual harassment cases, the fairness
issue is one of equal treatment by management of male and female
employees. Favoring the First Amendment right to free expression in
this context feeds a power dynamic-discrimination against women-
which not only favors men whether they are employers or employees,
but is legislatively prohibited. Judicial imposition of a sexual harass-
ment speech policy, therefore, does not really mediate between one
employee's speech rights and another employee's right to a non-hos-
tile environment. That would be an easy case, since private employees
have no speech rights. Rather, a judicially mandated sexual harass-
ment policy mediates between each employee's right to be protected
against discrimination in the workplace and the employer's right to
control employees' speech in the workplace.
B. Employer Free Speech and the Sexual Harassment Case
The plaintiff in Robinson, like the plaintiffs in Gissel and Snell,
seeks to force her employer to adhere to statutory dictates governing
the workplace; the employer claims that the remedy sought contra-
venes the First Amendment. The sexual harassment plaintiff-
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employee aligns herself against the employer, who is directly or indi-
rectly responsible for the environment and thus the expression of her
fellow employees. When a sexual harassment lawsuit names employ-
ees as defendants, those employees enjoy, for the moment, an alliance
with the employer.
In defending against a charge of sexual harassment, the employer
and defendant-employees may ostensibly argue for "free" speech. But
at bottom, an employer defending a hostile environment harassment
claim, like the employer asserting its First Amendment right to coerce
employees into voting down a union or to ignore co-worker vilifica-
tion of minority employees, is simply defending its right to plenary
control of the workplace.
This assertion of employer control through the First Amendment
is illustrated when an plaintiff-employee seeks First Amendment pro-
tection against dismissal. The employer, asserting the at-will employ-
ment doctrine or arguing that the Pickering/Connick balance test
works in its favor, rejects notions that the First Amendment protects
an employee's speech. But when, as in Robinson, Gissel, and Snell, a
plaintiff-employee seeks to restrict the speech of other employees or
management, the employer argues that both enjoy First Amendment
protection. This reversal of position by management seems contradic-
tory. However, from the employer's point of view, the two positions
are entirely consistent; management's argument is simply that the
employer, as employer, may set the terms of what is and is not appro-
priate speech on the job, without interference from the state. 34
It is hard to imagine a scenario where a private employer would
accede to an employee's assertion of a First Amendment right to dis-
cuss confidential information with competitors, or to shout obscen-
ities within earshot of customers. It is even less likely that an
employer would incur the expense of litigating a case promoting the
First Amendment rights of its employees unless the employer stood to
gain from the employee's success. For example, although JSI protests
the court's imposition of a policy prohibiting expression, JSI itself has
denied employee's requests to post political materials, advertisements,
and commercial materials in the workplace. 35 JSI employees have no
legal recourse to argue that JSI's imposition of the no-political-posters
134. See Browne, supra note 67, at 511 (discussing an employer's First Amendment defense
against a sexual harassment claim). "Although it might appear at first glance that the
employer is asserting its employees' constitutional rights rather than its own, that is not so for
several reasons ... [W]hen liability is imposed because of the employer's failure to censor its
employees, the employer is arguing that a law that holds it liable for failing to censor protected
speech violates its own First Amendment rights." Id.
135. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1494 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
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policy is unconstitutional. Only because JSI itself does not want to
adopt the sexual harassment policy are its employees able to assert,
through JSI, their free speech rights.'36
Employers do enjoy broad latitude to control the workplace,
including the freedom to impose--or not impose-speech policies
upon their employees. But as Part III pointed out, both the judiciary
and Congress have the power to modify or restrict traditional
employer control through a determination that policy concerns or
statutory mandates outweigh an employers' right to control speech in
the workplace. In private workplaces, public policy exceptions mod-
ify the at-will employment doctrine. In the context of union organiz-
ing, the NLRA restricts employer control of the workplace by
protecting union-related speech and by limiting employers' speech to
workers during a campaign. In public workplaces, the Pickering!
Connick balance test restricts the government's control over work-
place speech when the speech addresses an "issue of public con-
cern."'131 Why then, should not Title VII operate as a legislative
modifier on the employer prerogative to control workplace speech?
At least one commentator rejects the contention that labor
speech and unfair labor practice cases have any application to Title
VII sexual harassment cases. 38 Kingsley Browne argues that the rea-
soning of Gissel does not support a "general governmental right to
regulate speech in the workplace,"'' 39 and that the strong governmen-
tal interests present in Gissel are absent in sexual harassment cases.
He supports this argument by analogizing the Gissel speech to black-
mail, but contends that sexually offensive speech has "no relation to
any threat of future action."' 4 What Browne fails to recognize is that
while Gissel may not stand for a general right to governmental regula-
tion of workplace speech, it does stand for the proposition that when
Congress has determined, through legislation, that employers have
affirmative duties under a federal statute, employers may not resort to
136. Browne asserts that "the employer receives little gratification from its employee's free
speech," which leads one to wonder why an employer would go to the trouble to defend it.
Browne, supra note 67, at 505. The response that the employer defends employee free speech
to avoid litigation costs and damage awards is inadequate. Robinson was awarded no
damages, and JSI could have avoided the litigation at any point by simply adopting a sexual
harassment policy, or by telling the workers to take down the pinups. The conclusion that JSI
got some "gratification" from the expression of its employees is unavoidable, and one suspects
that keeping women out of the shipyard was a side effect of the pinups that the employers, no
less than the employees, appreciated.
137. Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
138. See Browne, supra note 67, at 513-15.
139. Id. at 514.
140. Id. at 515.
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a First Amendment defense to circumvent those duties. Title VII is
precisely analogous to the NLRA in this way. Furthermore, Browne
misreads the impact of speech found harassing under Title VII. Sexu-
ally harassing speech indeed constitutes a threat of future action: the
threat of an escalation of the speech to conduct, or of simply more of
the same speech. The threat--or the promise-is that neither women
nor minorities will enjoy the same workplace conditions of employ-
ment as do white males.
In addition, Browne argues that where the contested speech is
that of the employee, Gissel does not apply because Gissel relied on
the power differential between employer and employee, a dynamic
that he contends does not exist between co-workers. But this argu-
ment denies what Browne has already asserted: that the employer is,
in actuality, defending its own rights.'41 Moreover, this lack of ine-
quality argument assumes that the only power dynamic that exists in
a workplace is between employer and employee. As the Robinson
analysis shows, in a predominantly male workplace, where no females
occupy supervisory positions, and where management supports the
majority group's behavior, women experience a lack of power vis-A-vis
both employers and male co-workers.
Both the employee and employer free speech cases provide a
rationale for accepting the Robinson court's imposition of a policy
that regulates speech in the JSI workplace. Robinson makes no
unprecedented departure from courts' consistent understanding that
workplace speech is not quite like speech outside the workplace. The
mandate of Title VII to eradicate discrimination simply takes prece-
dence over an employee's individual right to free expression-which
is, in any case, virtually non-existent-and over an employer's right to
control speech policies in the workplace-which is otherwise almost
plenary.
C. The Robinson First Amendment Analysis
In light of the traditional role the First Amendment plays in the
workplace and the myriad forms of speech regularly banned by both
private and public employers, the civil libertarian concern over the
rights of welders to display pinup shots in the JSI shipyard seems
extraordinary. The controversy over Robinson may be because the
case involves sexually explicit photographs, which brings to mind the
First Amendment analysis applied in American Booksellers Associa-
tion v. Hudnut.42 Didn't the Hudnut opinion decide for us that there
141. Id. at 511.
142. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986).
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is a First Amendment right to demean women through language and
pictures, just as there is a First Amendment right for Nazis to march
in Skokie? 143
JSI's trial brief spent little time developing a First Amendment
defense, but did argue that an injunction barring speech under Title
VII would be unlawfully restrictive of free expression in the same way
that the Indianapolis ordinances in Hudnut were unconstitutional. 144
That is, an injunction forbidding sexually oriented graphic materials
in the workplace because of their message to women would, like the
Hudnut ordinance, impose an unconstitutional viewpoint-based
restriction on speech.
The plaintiff's characterization of the photos in the JSI work-
place as messages fostering a view of woman as sex objects does sound
suspiciously similar to the ideas that animated the Hudnut ordi-
nance.14 In adopting the ordinance, the Indianapolis City-County
Council found that "[p]ornography is a discriminatory practice based
on sex which denies women equal opportunities in society. Pornogra-
phy is central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis for discrimi-
nation. Pornography is a systematic practice of exploitation and
subordination based on sex which differentially harms women." 146
Similarly, Robinson justified its holding and injunction reasoning that
the "presence of the pictures ... sexualizes the work environment to
the detriment of all female employees . . . , has a disproportionately
demeaning impact on the women ... [and] convey[s] a message that
[women] do not belong." 147
Judge Melton, however, held that Hudnut's First Amendment
143. See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978);
Village of Skokie v. National Socialist Party, 373 N.E.2d 21 (111. 1978). In these cases, an
American neo-Nazi group, represented by the ACLU, gained permission to demonstrate in
Skokie, Illinois, a community with a large Jewish population that included many Holocaust
survivors.
144. See Trial Brief for Defendants at 43-46, Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760
F. Supp. 1486 (M.D. Fla. 1991) (No. 86-927).
145. Catharine MacKinnon, who authored the ordinances tested in Hudnut, was a primary
architect in the development of sexual harassment law. See MACKINNON, supra note 33.
146. INDIANAPOLIs ANTIPORNOGRAPHY ORDINANCE § 16-1(a)(2), reprinted in Marian L.
Lausher, Note, Redefining Pornography as Sex Discrimination: An Innovative Civil Rights
Approach, 20 NEW ENG. L. REV. 767 (1985) (app. C). MacKinnon herself puts the case even
more strongly: "Pornography institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy, which fuses
the erotization of dominance and submission with the social construction of male and female.
Gender is sexual. Pornography constitutes the meaning of that sexuality. Men treat women as
who they see women as being. Pornography constructs who that is. Men's power over women
means that the way men see women defines who women can be." MACKINNON, supra note 33,
at 148.
147. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523.
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analysis did not apply to Robinson.148 The Robinson opinion does not
define a specific class of sexual materials and deem them unprotected
by the First Amendment as did the Indianapolis ordinance.149
Rather, Robinson mandates a determination of whether pictures cre-
ate a hostile environment by reference to the context in which the
pictures appear. The contextual characteristics to be examined
include the ratio of men to women, the number of women in positions
of authority, the degree to which the industry or workplace was tradi-
tionally a male province, and the degree to which the workplace
norms included sexual behavior. 150 Thus Robinson limits the assump-
tion of the Indianapolis ordinances that sexually subordinating
expression always harms women; only when the plaintiff empirically
demonstrates male domination, rather than experientially or theoreti-
cally asserting it, will the court assume that sexually explicit photos
have discriminatory potential.
Robinson's emphasis on context and identifiable harm means,
most obviously, that the JSI sexual harassment policy will not apply
outside the workplace. Part of the concern over the Hudnut ordi-
nance was its virtual blanket ban on the display of pornography. 1'
JSI employees, unlike citizens subject to a Hudnut ordinance, are free
to post, read, display, and distribute whatever sexual materials and
photographs they desire-anywhere but the JSI shipyard. Moreover,
the JSI policy need not be the model for all workplaces. A remedy,
after all, may go no farther than is needed to correct the harm found.
The JSI regulations are not necessarily appropriate or applicable to
workplaces that do not share the unique characteristics of the JSI
shipyard.' 52
148. Id. at 1536.
149. Id. According to Robinson, the Hudnut ordinance was based on the proposition that
"pornography conveys a message that is always inappropriate and always subject to
punishment, regardless of the context." Id.
150. For a more complete discussion of the conditions necessary for a determination, under
Robinson, that sexual photographs create a hostile environment, see infra part V.A.
151. The ordinance prohibited forcing pornography on a person "in any place of
employment, in education, in a home, or in any public place." Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 325. The
court expressed concern that the ordinance might apply even to pictures shown to medical
students as part of their education. Id.
152. Whether in fact the Robinson injunction goes farther than necessary to correct the
harm is a strongly contested aspect of the case. See Press Release, American Civil Liberties
Union of Florida, "Marquez Misses Point in Pinup Case" (Dec. 10, 1991) (asserting that
under the Robinson order, "an employee's picture of his wife in a bathing suit would be
outlawed, not to mention any Jackie Collins novel"). Much is made of the fact that the
harassment policy presumes a picture to be sexually suggestive (and therefore prohibited) if it
"depicts a person of either sex who is not fully clothed or in clothes that are not suited to or
ordinarily accepted for the accomplishment of routine work in and around the shipyard."
Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1542. The policy, however, goes on to read "and who is posed for
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The specific ground for the court's rejection of the Hudnut analy-
sis was its conclusion that the pictures at JSI were not protected
speech because they "act[ed] as discriminatory conduct in the form of
a hostile work environment."1 53 The JSI photos as discrimination
violated Title VII, and thus, like other speech that constitutes a
crime-such as threats of violence, threats to intimidate witnesses, or
blackmail-were not protected by the First Amendment.
1 5 4
The Robinson court's designation of the photographs at JSI as
discriminatory conduct under Title VII, analogous to a crime, is
unsatisfactory. First, the court did not explore its analogy of a Title
VII violation to a crime such as blackmail, nor did it explain the
unnecessary stretch from a criminal to a civil context. The opinion
also overlooked the more pertinent labor law cases establishing that
the state may regulate employer speech that constitutes an NLRA
violation.1 55 More important, the characterization of the pinups as
conduct rather than speech is a circular approach to the problem. It
simply begs the question at the heart of the First Amendment attack:
if posting sexually explicit photographs of women is discriminatory
conduct under Title VII and thus subject to censorship, is Title VII
constitutional? This is the Hudnut question all over again.
156
the obvious purpose of displaying or drawing attention to the private portions of his or her
body." Id.
153. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1535.
154. Id. The Robinson court also reviewed various alternative justifications for regulating
the sexual images at JSI, were they to be considered fully protected speech. The court
considered the proposed regulation of discriminatory speech only a time, place, and manner
regulation of speech. Id. In addition, the female workers at JSI were a "captive audience."
Id. The captive audience doctrine arose over concern about unwanted communications in the
home. See Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736-37 (1970) (upholding
law allowing post office to stop all mailings of erotic or sexually provocative mail to homes of
those who request it); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 744-51 (1976) (holding that the
Federal Communications, Commission has power to regulate indecent radio broadcasts
because in the home, "the individuals' right to be let alone plainly outweighs the First
Amendment rights of an intruder"). Although various writers have suggested that the captive
audience concept is appropriate to the workplace, courts have not yet applied it in a workplace
context. See Balkin, supra note 68, at 423 ("Few audiences are more captive than the average
worker."); Strauss, supra note 68, at 35-37 ("Employees at work, like residents in their homes,
may qualify for captive audience status"). Robinson's extension of this principle to the
workplace was apparently a first, and referred to no caselaw. Ultimately, however, the
opinion's First Amendment treatment rests on its determination that the photos in question
were not protected speech, but were discriminatory conduct that violated Title VII. Robinson,
760 F. Supp. at 1535.
155. The court did find support for restrictions on expression in the workplace from racially
abusive language cases and public employee speech cases. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1536; see
also supra part III.A.2 and B.2.
156. Speaking of the stalemate in the debate over the Hudnut antipornography ordinances,
Christina Spaulding remarked, "The question then becomes: why isn't equality a sufficiently
strong interest to justify the abridgement of certain kinds of speech. Why may the state
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The Hudnut question-whether the statutory civil rights of
minorities trump the First Amendment rights of the majority-is the
wrong question to ask in the Robinson case. To begin with, it assumes
that the conflict is between employees' rights to a non-hostile environ-
ment on the one hand, and free speech on the other. But the tension
in Robinson and other sexual harassment cases, as noted earlier, is
actually between the employee's right to a non-hostile environment
and the employer's right to impose, or not impose, whatever work-
place restrictions the employer sees fit. In addition, the limited reach
of Robinson's injunction, imposed after a finding that the pictures cre-
ated an environment hostile to women, stands in sharp contrast to the
Hudnut ordinance's ban on an entire class of photographs regardless
of the context or their impact.
Hudnut faced off First Amendment rights to public expression of
potentially damaging opinions against women's civil rights to partici-
pate in public life as full and equal citizens. Robinson, in contrast, pits
employees' rights to be free from discrimination in the conditions of
their employment against employers' rights to say whatever they want
to employees, and to regulate, dictate, punish, approve of, encourage,
or reward the speech of their employees. An employer's right to con-
trol the workplace does not overwhelm an employee's right to a work-
place free of discrimination, or the employer's affirmative duty to
provide one.
V. PINUPS AS SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Even if one accepts that an employer First Amendment defense
does not apply to a workplace sexual harassment case, the popular
reading of Robinson-that the government can ban Playboy calendars
from a workplace-remains troubling to many. Do we really want to
put nude photographs into the category of discriminatory conduct
under Title VII? Why did the Robinson court understand pinup pos-
ters in the workplace as sources of discrimination against women,
rather than simply bad taste or inappropriate behavior?
Robinson is apparently the first case in which the plaintiff
presented expert evidence explaining why pinups in the workplace
may constitute a hostile environment. The opinion, carefully read,
provides a rationale for determining the circumstances in which sex-
ual photographs constitute legal harassment. Part A describes the
endorse the view that 'sex should not look like this' when 'this' is obscene, but not when 'this'
is degrading and violent [or discriminatory] toward women?" Christina Spaulding, Anti-
Pornography Laws as a Claim for Equal Respect. Feminism, Liberalism & Community, 4
BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 128, 136-37 (1988).
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testimony and studies presented to the court in support of the theory
that sexual imagery in the workplace discriminates against women.
Part B addresses two policy objections to the Robinson holding, and
contends that such objections are misplaced. Finally, Part C suggests
that the Robinson analysis provides a reconciliation between two
opposing theoretical frameworks for sex discrimination analysis, the
equality principal and the dominance theory.
A. Stereotyping Women Workers as Sexual Objects
To state a claim for sexual harassment, a plaintiff must show that
but for her sex, she would not have been the object of harassment."'
Courts have recognized three categories of behavior that raise a pre-
sumption of the required causal link between harassment and a female
victim's sex: behavior directed at women and motivated by an
antiwoman animus;' 5s sexual conduct directed at women;' 59 and con-
duct which, though not directed against a particular group or individ-
157. Five elements comprise a hostile environment claim: (1) the plaintiff must belong to a
protected category; (2) the harassment complained of must have been unwelcome; (3) the
harassment must have been causally linked to the plaintiff's sex; (4) the harassment must affect
a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the defendants must have known or
should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt, effective remedial action. See
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66-69 (1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 628
F.2d 897, 903-05 (11th Cir. 1982); Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1522. The Robinson court dealt
with elements (1) and (2) cursorily, stating that Robinson "indisputedly belonged to a
protected category" (women) and that the harassing conduct was not solicited or incited. Id.
Elements (3) and (4) are discussed infra Part V. As for the fifth element, corporate JSI and a
number of individual managers at JSI were defendants. Some of the individual defendants in
Robinson were found liable while others were not, depending upon the extent of their effective
control over employment decisions in the workplace. The court imposed upon JSI, as
corporate employer, both actual and constructive knowledge of the hostile state of its
environment, found its remedial responses ineffective, and found JSI subject to direct and
indirect liability. The Robinson decision treated the issue of employer liability at some length.
Id. at 1527-32. For a discussion of the numerous issues raised by the various approaches to
employer liability used by the courts, see Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work
Environment under Title VII, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1460-63 (1984); Nadine Taub, Keeping
Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimination, 21 B.C.
L. REV. 345, 377-87 (1980).
158. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3rd Cir. 1990) (the
offensive conduct is not necessarily required to include sexual overtones in every instance);
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 905 (1st Cir. 1988) (constant verbal attacks
challenging women's capacity to be surgeons, although not explicitly sexual, were charged
with antifemale animus and therefore contributed to hostile environment).
159. See, e.g., Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers Inc., 830 F.2d 1554 (11th Cir. 1987)
(reversing summary judgment on claim of sexual harassment where plaintiff's boss made
repeated sexual advances); Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (reversing
summary judgment on plaintiff's claim that director repeatedly asked her to join him socially,
made threatening sexual remarks to her, and suggested her employment status would improve
if she cooperated with him).
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ual, has a disproportionate effect on women. 160 The photographs at
JSI, according to Robinson, fell into this third category.1 61
What is it about sexually explicit photos that affect women as a
class differently than men? The testimony of Robinson's expert wit-
nesses on the effects of sex role stereotyping in the workplace pro-
vided the court with the link between nude photographs of women
and sex discrimination.1 62 According to Dr. Susan Fiske, 63 an expert
on stereotyping, pinups of nude or scantily clad women, shot in sexu-
ally submissive poses, reinforce impermissible sexual stereotypes of
women. They convey a message that women "are welcome in the
workplace only if they will subvert their identities to the sexual stereo-
types prevalent in that environment." ' 6 The sex-objectification of
women disadvantages them, burdening them with a condition or term
of employment to which men are not subject.16
Reliance on stereotyping for cues about people and situations is
so common that some consider it human nature. Behavior that grows
out of stereotyped notions of race, religion, sex, or national origin is
equally prevalent. However, within the context of the workplace,
such behavior, to the extent that it affects an individual's compensa-
tion, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, is discrimination,
and therefore an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. 66
Robinson's contribution is the recognition that environmental sex-role
stereotyping on the job is uniquely susceptible to detection and
regulation.
For example, Fiske testified, and the court accepted as fact, that
certain preconditions enhance the prevalence of stereotyping in any
160. See, e.g., Waltman v. International Paper, 875 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that
graffiti, though not directed at plaintiff, was relevant to her claim and that even a woman who
was not the object of harassment might have a Title VII hostile environment claim); Andrews,
895 F.2d at 1485-86 (noting that although men might react to obscene language and
pornography as harmless and innocent, women might react otherwise).
161. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523.
162. Stereotyping is the study of category-based responses in human thought and
perceptual processes. Id. at 1502. Stereotyping means responding to a person on the basis of a
category, thus attributing to the person traits and characteristics associated with the category,
rather than evaluating the individual on her own merits. The emotional manifestation of
stereotyping is prejudice; the behavioral manifestation is discrimination. Id. at 1502-05.
163. Dr. Fiske is a professor of psychology at the University of Massachusetts at Amherst,
and has published in numerous journals in her field. She also appeared as an expert witness on
stereotyping in Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp 1109 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd in
relevant part, 825 F.2d 458, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
For a discussion of Hopkins and the role that Fiske's testimony played in the Court's holding,
see infra notes 170-73 and accompanying text.
164. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523.
165. Id. at 1505-06.
166. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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given environment. 167 First, stereotyping is more likely to occur in a
skewed population-that is, where one group or category of people is
smaller than another group. Second, stereotyping occurs with
increased frequency when a power structure or hierarchy exists that
excludes a group and thus inhibits that group's sense of belonging.
Third, stereotyping is more prevalent in circumstances where specific
stimuli in the work environment, such as sexual photographs,
encourage or reinforce certain stereotypical categories. 68  Elimina-
tion of the conditions that reinforce stereotyping is a logical means of
deterring it.
Applied to JSI, Fiske's analysis of stereotyping is simple. At JSI,
men vastly outnumbered women. The JSI shipyard and the welding
trade had a strong tradition of male dominance. No women occupied,
or had ever occupied, positions of power at JSI. In such an atmos-
phere, sexual joking, profanity, and numerous photographs of nude
women sharpened the tendencies of the dominant group (men) to cat-
egorize workers along gender lines. The photographs reinforced the
differences between males and females in terms of sexual attributes,
and encouraged workers to evaluate females primarily in terms of
their conformity to stereotyped visions of femaleness. Femaleness at
JSI meant sexual attractiveness, availability, a preoccupation with
sex, and a predisposition towards submissiveness. Under Fiske's anal-
ysis, a woman worker at JSI would be likely to experience the result-
ing atmosphere as hostile to her because of her sex.
The study of stereotyping, and a judicial view of stereotyping as
discrimination, are not new with Robinson.169 In Price Waterhouse v.
167. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1503-05.
168. See id. Fiske testified that studies show that photographs of nude women encourage a
male population to view and interact with women co-workers as if they are sex objects. One
study randomly assigned male college students as subjects who viewed either a non-violent but
pornographic film or a film without pornographic content. Those who viewed the
pornographic film later remembered little about the female interviewer except for her physical
attributes, while those who viewed the neutral film remembered more about the interview
itself. In addition, the female interviewers could reliably distinguish which males had seen
which film from the conduct of the males during the interview. Id. at 1503-04 (citing Mohr &
Zanna, Treating Women as Sex Objects: Look to the (Gender Schematic) Male Who Has
Viewed Pornography, 16 PERSP. & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 296 (1990)).
169. See Mary F. Radford, Sex Stereotyping and the Promotion of Women to Positions of
Power, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 471, 487-503 (1990); Taub, supra note 157, at 349-61. Both of these
articles collect and discuss a significant body of social science data on stereotyping. Radford
examines the prevalence of sex stereotyping in the workplace, argues that sex stereotyping
constitutes a harmful ingredient in any employment setting, and suggests that under Title VII
employers should be held "accountable for allowing deeply embedded stereotypes to taint their
decision-making processes." Radford, supra, at 476. Taub proposes stereotyping per se as a
fourth concept of discrimination. Taub, supra note 157.
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Hopkins, 7 ' the American Psychological Association filed an amicus
curiae brief with the Supreme Court outlining the extent and quality
of sex stereotyping research and the general acceptance of the
research in the scientific community. Five decades of research in the
area, 12,689 articles on human sex differences in fifteen years, and
three hundred articles on sex stereotyping in thirteen years have
yielded "an internally valid pattern of consistent, mutually confirma-
tory findings."' 7'
The Supreme Court put its imprimatur on the concept of stere-
otyping as impermissible sex discrimination in Hopkins. Hopkins held
that the employer had the burden of proving by a preponderance of
the evidence that it did not base its denial of the employee's promo-
tion on impermissible bias reflected by stereotypical thinking about
female employees. The stereotyping in Hopkins was not about char-
acterizing women as sex objects, but about characterizing women as
unsuited for partnership because they were either "too feminine" or
"too masculine."' 7 2 Hopkins recognized the double bind placed on
women in such situations, and reiterated that Title VII forbids
employers from considering gender in employment decisions. The
causal connection between the stereotyping and the decision not to
promote Hopkins was obvious to Justice Brennan, who wrote, "It
takes no special training to discern sex stereotyping" in some of the
defendant's remarks.173
Hopkins is only the latest of cases showing courts' understanding
of stereotyping as an evil targeted by Title VII. In Dothard v. Rawlin-
son, 174 the Supreme Court summarized and endorsed the common
theme in lower courts' rulings: "[T]he federal courts have agreed that
it is impermissible under Title VII to refuse to hire an individual
170. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
171. Amicus Curiae Brief of American Psychological Association for Respondent, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (No. 87-1167).
172. Sociological studies on stereotyping indicate that stereotypes of men and women in the
workplace lead to perceptions that management and leadership are "men's work," that
"masculine" traits are more positive and connected with success and power than "feminine"
traits, and that women who exhibit masculine traits are deviant. Radford, supra note 169, at
494-96.
173. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 256. Although Brennan accepted the district court's reliance on
Dr. Fiske's testimony on sex stereotyping and declined "to adopt the dissent's dismissive
attitude toward Dr. Fiske's field of study and toward her own professional integrity," id. at
255, he considered the testimony "merely icing on Hopkin's cake," id. at 256. Brennan
believed that it did not require expertise in psychology to know that partners' remarks that
Hopkins needed a course at charm school and that she should "'walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear makeup, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry,' " id. at 235, were based on the employee's sex and not her interpersonal skills. Id.
174. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
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woman or man on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the
sexes."' 175 In Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v. Man-
hart, 7 6 the Court noted that "[i]t is now well recognized that employ-
ment decisions cannot be predicated on mere 'stereotyped'
impressions about the characteristics of males or females."'177 " 'In
forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of
their sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and woman resulting from sex stereotypes.' "178
The courts of appeals have consistently found that sex-stereotyped
assertions about employees given as reasons for discharge constitute
Title VII violations. 79 In addition, the Supreme Court has not hesi-
tated to strike down differential treatment of the sexes under Equal
Protection claims on the theory that "the role-typing society has long
imposed" is inconsistent with contemporary reality. 80 The Supreme
Court, in other words, has had no problem with the concept of stere-
otyping, and has applied it in both statutory and constitutional
spheres. 1 '
Courts have determined, then, that gender stereotyping that
dichotomizes character traits and categorically attributes traits to
individuals on the basis of gender is detrimental and discriminatory in
the workplace when it affects a promotion or discharge. This ration-
ale should also permit the determination that stereotyping is discrimi-
natory when it affects the workplace environment-a "condition" of
employment. If stereotyped attitudes can demonstrably influence
employment decisions and prevent the promotion or hiring of women,
it follows that stereotyped attitudes can also work a more subtle form
175. Id. at 333.
176. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
177. Id. at 707.
178. Id. at 707 n.13 (quoting Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (7th
Cir. 1971)).
179. See, e.g., Fields v. Clark Univ., 817 F.2d 931 (1st Cir. 1987) (pervasive sexist attitude
of male members of sociology department was direct evidence of discrimination against female
teacher they did not tenure); Fadhl v. City & County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1165
(9th Cir. 1984) (sex-stereotyped statements by police officers that plaintiff was "too much like a
woman," "very ladylike ... which ... may cause problems," and could become "feminine
again" after work, supported finding that sex was factor in termination); Thorne v. City of El
Segundo, 726 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (refusal to hire a woman because of sex stereotyped
views of woman's physical abilities violates Title VII).
180. Taub, supra note 157, at 409-10 (citing and discussing the willingness of the Court to
identify stereotypical motivation in equal protection cases: Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76
(1979); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 207 (1977);
Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 343 (1977); and Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973)).
181. For a more extensive development of the Court's acceptance of the concept of
stereotyping, see Taub, supra note 157, at 405-17.
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of discrimination through the work environment. 82
This analysis assumes, of course, that sex-object stereotyping-a
categorization that emphasizes sexual attributes-discriminates
against women. It could be argued that a co-worker's appraisal of a
woman as a sex object has little to do with her ability to perform her
job. If the co-worker has no power over the woman's promotions and
benefits, and does not manifest his attitudes by any overt advances, in
what way does even a pervasive workplace attitude that women
belong in the bedroom (and not in the shipyard) actually discriminate
against women? While the harm caused by some types of stereotyp-
ing are obvious-say, prohibiting women from performing certain
jobs in the shipyard because of a stereotyped notion that women can't
be trusted with sharp instruments-what's wrong, legally, with stere-
otyping women as sex objects?"8 3
According to Fiske, studies show that an atmosphere that
encourages the stereotyping of women as sex objects affects women's
ability to do their jobs.I84 The stereotyping overwhelms a view of a
woman as a capable, committed worker, and in effect blots out all
other characteristics. This phenomenon, known as "sex-role spil-
lover," leads to the evaluation of women employees by co-workers on
the basis of their worth as sexual objects rather than as workers. 85
Although this phenomenon works to women's detriment in almost
any job, it is an even greater problem for women in traditionally male-
dominated trades, where male workers view the skills necessary to be
a good plumber or welder as utterly inconsistent with the attributes of
female sexuality.
Sex-object stereotyping forces women to monitor or alter their
behavior either to conform to the stereotyping (in an effort to be
accepted on some level), or to make clear that they are rejecting sex-
object status (in an effort to avoid unwanted sexual advances). 8 6 The
resulting anxiety, emotional upset, and expended effort which women
182. Justice O'Connor, concurring in Hopkins, noted that although sex-stereotyped "stray
remarks" cannot justify a burden shift to the employer to prove legitimate hiring criteria, they
may be probative of sexual harassment, Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(citing Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)), indicating an openness to
considering stereotyping as impermissible when it contributes to a sexually harassing work
environment as well as when it affects a hiring decision.
183. See Browne, supra note 67, at 491 n.60. "Suffice it to say that it is far from clear that
sexuality implies a lack of respect. Put another way, there is no necessary contradiction in
viewing one's colleague (or even one's subordinate) as an attractive sexual being and a
competent co-worker." Id.
184. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1504-05 (M.D. Fla.
1991).
185. Id. at 1503.
186. Id. at 1505.
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otherwise could direct toward job performance is the sex-based bur-
den borne by women and not by men. 87 This burden constitutes the
employment barrier and the discrimination. Its effects on women are
manifested in reduced job satisfaction, an increased chance of quitting
or being fired, and deterrence from seeking promotions or transfers. 8'
In sum, the Fiske evidence showed that environmental stimuli
exacerbate the stereotyping of one group of workers by another when
the ratio of the stereotyped group to the dominant group is uneven,
and when the marginalized group members hold no positions of
power or history of belonging. When environmental stimuli are sex-
ual, the stereotyping is along gender lines and focuses on sexual
attributes. While male sexuality is not viewed, stereotypically, as an
indication of employee incompetence, female sexuality often is, espe-
cially in a traditionally male trade. Thus the presence of nude pinups
not only subjects women to the pressures of either conforming to or
contradicting the sex-object stereotyping to get along with their co-
workers, but acts as a constant reminder that their essential natures
are viewed as antithetical to the skills necessary on the job.' 9
The Robinson court's finding that the pinups at JSI created a hos-
tile environment for women flowed directly from the court's accept-
ance of the evidence presented by Fiske. The studies on stereotyping
provided the court with a wealth of empirical data that applied specif-
187. Men, as a group, are not affected by a sexualized workplace. Research shows that
most men report that they would be flattered if they were sexually approached in the
workplace by a woman. Id.; see also Abrams, supra note 50, at 1204-05 (discussing women's
distinctive responses to sexual behavior on the job). Abrams notes the tendency of women,
because they generally occupy the lower rungs of most workplace hierarchies, to view their
position in the workplace as marginal or precarious. They are thus likely to construe
stereotypical views of women as serious judgments about their competence on the job. In
addition, women's greater social and physical vulnerability to sexual coercion leads women as
a group to hold more restrictive views about the types of situations in which sexual conduct is
appropriate. Thus women react differently than do men to the appearance of sexuality in an
unexpected context or in a setting of ostensible equality. Id.
188. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1503.
189. Stereotyping women as sex objects not only burdens women in the workplace, but
effectively operates to keep women out of the workplace, thus frustrating the purpose of Title
VII. The persistence of and role played by male workplace norms in maintaining job-related
sex segregation is discussed in Abrams, supra note 50, at 1189-1209; Arriola, supra note 65, at
58-65; Schultz, supra note 65. Schultz challenges the present judicial framework that assumes
that women bring to the labor market fixed preferences for traditional or nontraditional jobs.
"Women in female jobs understand that they will be likely to experience harassment if they
attempt to cross the gender divide.... Harassment is also driving the small number of women
in nontraditional jobs away." Id. at 1834 (footnotes omitted). Although Fiske's studies did
not document this phenomenon, the Robinson opinion remarked upon it. "A pre-existing
atmosphere that deters women from entering ... a profession or job is no less destructive to
and offensive to workplace equality than a sign declaring 'Men Only.'" Robinson, 760 F.
Supp. at 1526 (quoting Abrams, supra note 50, at 1212 n. 118).
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ically to the impact of sexual images on women within the work-
place-but only within workplaces where men predominate,
numerically, hierarchically, and historically. Accordingly, the thresh-
old issue in any hostile environment claim based on sexual photo-
graphs should be whether the factors that escalate the stereotyping of
women are present. Specifically, are women in the minority in the
workplace, job, or industry? Do they hold positions of authority or
power? Has the workplace been traditionally dominated by males or
viewed as a male province? Is the job considered "men's work"? If so,
the workplace pinups can be presumed to exacerbate the tendencies-
already extant in such environments, as documented by numerous
studies-to impermissibly stereotype women as sex objects. 90
B. Objections to the Robinson Analysis
Many commentators take issue with the theory that sexually
explicit photographs of women in subordinate positions harm women.
Some feminists argue that pornography enhances women's sexual
autonomy by making sex open to public examination and debate.
Pornography advocates sexual adventure, and sex for pleasure only,
which women may experience as legitimizing their own sexual desires.
Pornographic images may include elements of play and fantasy,
express a defiant snub at an uptight culture, celebrate lesbian sexual-
ity, serve as an aphrodisiac, or provide a thrill, safe and contained
within the boundaries of a photograph. Anticensorship feminists
counsel against equating sex with the degradation of women and male
arousal with violence. 191
The Robinson parallel to this critique of pornography is twofold.
First, some fear that the very idea that the law must protect women
190. It is important to keep in mind that under Robinson the evaluation of whether a
pattern of male dominance exists in a workplace is separate from the question of whether the
prevalence of the photographs in the workplace-or other harassing conduct-rises to a level
"sufficiently pervasive" to affect an employment condition. A judge may find, under the
Robinson analysis, that sexual pinups would support a finding of potential hostile environment
sexual harassment due to the showing of male dominance in the workplace, but that the pinup
displays were so few and far between that a hostile environment did not in fact result.
Conversely, a judge might find that an extensive number of sexually oriented photographs were
displayed throughout a workplace, but that due to the lack of a showing of male dominance,
the photos by themselves do not support a claim.
191. See WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP, supra note 25, especially Sara Diamond,
Pornography: Image and Reality, at 40; Ann Snitow, Retrenchment versus Transformation:
The Politics of the Antipornography Movement, at 107; Lisa Duggan et al., False Promises.
Feminist Antipornography Legislation in the US., at 130; see also Paula Webster, Pornography
and Pleasure, 12 HERESIES 49 (1981) (arguing that the campaign against pornography created
a new feminist orthodoxy that reflected Victorian ideology).
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from sexual "vulgarities" sets women back, not forward. 92
Accepting the premise of a special female vulnerability to sex in the
workplace might shift the focus of discrimination policies to sexual
differences and away from the goal of equality. Second, the Robinson
holding could lead to a sanitization of the workplace, which both men
and woman would find oppressive. 193 Was Title VII meant to man-
date a pristine, characterless working environment?
1. PROTECTIVE POLICIES?
Certainly, judicial determination that women need policies to
protect their sexual vulnerabilities has resulted in "accommodations"
that turn out to ingrain rather than rout inequality in the workplace.
It is difficult to explain that an atmosphere perfectly acceptable to a
man discriminates against women without further stereotyping
women and encouraging exclusionary or paternalistic policies.
A pair of cases illustrate the problem. Dothard v. Rawlinson ' 94
upheld Alabama prison officials' refusal to hire female prison guards
in male maximum security prisons, because prisoners were more
likely to attack women guards. The Court assumed women's sexual
vulnerability without addressing the conditions that created it.
Dothard thus reinforced rather than redressed sexual inequality by
excluding women from the higher-paying position of maximum secur-
ity guard. More recently, in Torres v. Wisconsin Department of
Health and Social Services,'" the Court of Appeal for the Seventh
Circuit upheld defendant's maintenance of an all-female staff of
prison guards on the justification that it was required for the rehabili-
tation of sexually abused female inmates. The prison had deliberately
designed this sex-conscious policy to redress the sexual domination of
male guards over female inmates. However, the court failed to
ground its acceptance of this sex-conscious policy in the relative social
conditions of women and men. Instead, it articulated a "totality of
192. See WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP, supra note 25, especially Lynn King, Censorship
and Law Reform: Will Changing the Laws Mean a Change for the Better?, at 79; Anna
Gronau, Women and Images: Toward a Feminist Analysis of Censorship, at 91; see also
Browne, supra note 67, at 488 (arguing that the assumption that women may be more offended
by pornography than men is just the sort of stereotype Title VII was intended to erase); The
War on Nudity: The Great Pinup Controversy, PLAYBOY, July 1991, at 41 ("Do women need
protection from images of sex? The judge thought so. Ironically, it was this kind of
patronizing attitude that inspired the feminist revolution in the first place.").
193. See The War on Nudity: The Great Pinup Controversy, supra note 192, at 41. "[M]en
personalize a cold steel environment with sexual images. Women such as Robinson sterilize.
... Are (the photographs] the moral equivalent of a burning cross? Only in the fevered
imagination of feminist crusaders." Id.
194. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
195. 859 F.2d 1523 (7th Cir. 1988).
1991]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the circumstances" test for determining the legitimacy of a "bona fide
occupational qualification" ("BFOQ"); 96 held that sex as a BFOQ
need not be based on objective evidence but could be justified by
"commonsense understanding";1 9 and encouraged judicial deference
to the "reasoned decision[s]" of employers.1 98 The Torres court thus
expanded the discretion of employers to implement gender discrimi-
natory policies-those that exclude women, as well as those that
address vulnerabilities. 99
Both Dothard and Torres viewed women's sexual vulnerability as
a sex difference, and therefore a justification for gender discrimina-
tion, rather than recognizing it as a result of gender inequality.
Neither court pushed beyond a notion of difference to an examination
of the power relations that reinforce women's subordination and pro-
duce the vulnerability.
Robinson, unlike Dothard and Torres, is responsive to the con-
cern over protective policies. Judge Melton's opinion clearly recog-
nized that the harm suffered by women workers at JSI from the pinup
posters grew out of a social context already operating to put women in
a particularly vulnerable position. The opinion acknowledged that
sexual images do not automatically or necessarily stereotype women
to their detriment if the effects of the stereotype-priming by the pic-
tures is nullified by an equal power dynamic between men and women
in the workplace. It is, after all, the stereotyping that is impermissi-
ble, not the sexual images.
In addition, the opinion emphasizes that the point of eradicating
sexually hostile work environments is not to "protect" women from
exposure to vulgarity, but rather, consonant with the purpose of Title
VII, to eliminate factors that inhibit women from entering a particular
work environment or profession. "Only those women who are willing
to and can accept the level of abuse inherent in a given workplace...
will apply to and continue to work there. It is absurd to believe that
Title VII opened the doors of such places in form and closed them in
196. Title VII permits sex-based discrimination "in those certain instances where ... sex
... is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise." 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1982).
197. Torres, 859 F.2d at 1581.
198. Id. at 1532.
199. See Recent Cases, Bona Fide Occupational Qualification Defense-Necessity of Sex
Discriminatory Policy Should Be Evaluated According to a Totality of the Circumstances Test,
102 HARV. L. REV. 2048 (1989) (arguing that Torres expands the ability of employers to
implement sex-conscious policies without expressly limiting that power to uses that redress
gender inequality, and that courts should examine gender socialization and sexual domination
when examining the legitimacy of a BFOQ, rather than examining whether a classification
unjustifiably distinguishes between the sexes given a "pre-existing assumption of equality").
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substance. ' ' 210 The Robinson injunction does protect women, but it
protects them from the type of exclusion that the protective regula-
tion in Dothard permitted and reinforced.
2. BIG SISTER IN THE WORKPLACE?
Robinson's injunction prohibiting sexual photographs in the
workplace also engenders fears of overbearing, intrusive regula-
tions.20 1 Those who hold this view seem to accept that an employer
may have a legitimate interest in what employees say on the job, but
that the state does not.2°2 However, even conceding that the state has
an appropriate interest in regulating some speech in the workplace,
should the state's interest extend to more "personal" brands of speech
such as pinup posters?20 3 Won't cases such as Robinson eliminate
from the workplace not only expression proven to be discriminatory,
but all even arguably sexual expression?
200. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1526.
201. See Talking Dirty, NEw REPUBLIC, Nov. 4, 1991, at 7 (contending that the hostile
environment test that finds "pinup calendars, most well-intentioned compliments, and even
some gross remarks" to be discrimination is "scary" and "perverse"); see also Browne, supra
note 67, at 501-09. Browne argues that the application of hostile environment sexual
harassment law has an "extraordinary chilling effect on speech." Id. at 508. As an example of
this extraordinary chill, Browne points out that sound legal advice in "today's legal climate"
would encourage employers to refrain from off-color, racial, or ethnic jokes, and to prevent
employees from making "arguably" offensive comments. Id.
202. If, as this Comment argues, the fight over the JSI sexual harassment policy is more
about the employer's assertion of plenary control in the workplace than about general free
speech values, the state may be a more benign regulator than the employer. After all, the
state's powers to regulate only come to bear under a Title VII action when an aggrieved
employee has proven her case.
203. Disagreement as to whether pinups are purely "personal" expression is at the crux of
the debate. Speech protesting sexual harassment has been held to be speech of a personal,
rather than public nature. See Deremo v. Watkins, 939 F.2d 908 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding
that letters seeking compensation for promise to remain silent regarding alleged sexual
harassment were not speech regarding a public issue and were not protected by the First
Amendment); Callaway v. Hafeman, 832 F.2d 414 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that sexual
harassment complaint was speech of personal, not public nature and thus not protected by the
First Amendment). No court has yet passed on whether speech constituting sexual
harassment has any public/political speech value, although Hudnut assumed that
pornography, to the extent that it expresses a particular view of women, does have such value.
See American Booksellers Ass'n, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 330 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating
that pornography fosters bigotry and that bigotry "influence[s] the culture and shape[s] our
socialization"), aff'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). Playboy Magazine considered the pinups at JSI to
be expressions of "the robust community values of the shipyard." The War on Nudity: The
Great Pinup Controversy, supra note 192, at 41. As Fischl points out, under Connick, public
employees enjoy constitutional protection only for public/political speech, while under the
NLRA, private sector employees enjoy statutory protection only for speech regarding
personal/employment issues. Fischl, supra note 108, at 740. Were it not for Title VII, then,
sexually harassing photographs, if viewed as political statements about women as a class, could
be protected in government workplaces, but not in the private sector under the NRLA.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The civil libertarian nightmare of the sterile, impersonal work-
place is unrealistic. Robinson's facts and limited holding deny the
prospects of oppressive state-regulated workplace decor. The Robin-
son analysis, based as it was on empirical studies of workplace behav-
ior and effects, applies only in a limited set of workplaces. Where the
potentially detrimental impact of sexually explicit photographs is
counterbalanced by an atmosphere where women enjoy relatively
equal status with their male counterparts, the foundation for the hos-
tile environment action is considerably weakened. Robinson is likely
to apply only in traditionally male-dominated trades, or in workplaces
where the sexes are segregated by job. These are precisely the work-
places where Title VII has had little to no effect, and where the need
for an innovative approach to eradicating workplace norms that per-
petuate male domination and sex segregation is greatest.
Moreover, whether an environment is hostile still depends on a
determination that the complained of images rise to a level "suffi-
ciently severe or pervasive 'to alter the conditions of [the victim's]
employment.' "2o Isolated instances of less than politically correct
visuals in the workplace will not qualify as "sufficiently pervasive."
Finally, the Robinson analysis tests a workplace's hostility both sub-
jectively and objectively.2 °5 A plaintiff must prove not only that she
was affected by the hostile environment, but that a reasonable woman
would also find the environment hostile.20 6 The hypersensitive
woman will not be vindicated, and defendants need not conform their
workplaces to idiosyncratic tastes.
C. Implications for Sexual Harassment Analysis
Fiske's testimony on stereotyping and women's reactions to sex
in the workplace, and Robinson's limiting of its analysis to workplaces
204. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982)), quoted in Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1523.
205. Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524.
206. Courts have recently begun to couch their objective testing of a sexually harassing
hostile environment in terms of the "reasonable woman," recognizing that a court's
supposedly neutral analysis may in fact contain a hidden male perspective. See, e.g., Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the perspective of a reasonable woman
because "a sex-blind reasonable person standard tends to be male-biased and tends to
systematically ignore the experiences of women"); Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d
1469, 1482 (11 th Cir. 1990) (holding that harassment must detrimentally affect a reasonable
person of the same sex and in the same position as the victim); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d
630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987) (adopting reasonable woman standard for case involving male
harassment of a female because men and women are "vulnerable in different ways and offended
by different behavior"). For a discussion of the reasonableness standard in hostile work
environment cases, see Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology
of Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177 (1990).
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with an established pattern of male dominance, explain both why and
when pinup posters can be characterized as discrimination under Title
VII. Significantly, the opinion achieves this by tapping into two dif-
ferent presumptions underlying sex discrimination analysis: the dom-
inance theory, and the equality principle.
Sex discrimination law under Title VII is grounded on the equal-
ity principle-the supposition that men and women are similarly situ-
ated for purposes of employment, and therefore must be treated
exactly the same.2"7 Dominance theorists, who recognize differences
between the sexes and attribute those differences to women's tradi-
tionally inferior social status, have launched a powerful critique of the
equality principle as the point of departure in sex discrimination anal-
ysis.2"' These scholars point out that the equality view confuses for-
mal with substantive equality, and ignores the social consequences of
sex-linked traits and experiences. 2° A supposition that the sexes are
"equal," many theorists argue, has led to a judicial expectation that
women accomodate to male-dominated institutions, rather than the
reverse.210 The equality principle is of little help, therefore, in expos-
ing the structural male bias that has created the workplace as we
know it.21'
The equality principle's assumption that the sexes are similarly
situated has obvious problems for a generalized hostile environment
sexual harassment claim: if men and women are similarly situated
with regard to sex in the workplace, then any sexual expression that is
not specifically hostile and directed at a particular woman should
have an equal impact on all workers, which is to say, no impact at all.
Of course, individually, men may be equally offended by materials of
a sexual nature in the workplace; individually, some women may not
experience offense from sexually oriented photos. So if a man and a
woman react differently to the same workplace stimuli, their reactions
must be idiosyncratic, rather than sex-based. Sexually explicit photo-
graphs in the workplace, then, though they may offend some women,
cannot be sex discrimination under the equality principle analysis.2, 2
207. See Abrams, supra note 50, at 1186.
208. See MacKinnon, supra note 22; MACKINNON, supra note 33.
209. See Deborah L. Rhode, The "No-Problem" Problem: Feminist Challenges and
Cultural Change, 100 YALE L.J. 1731, 1755 (1991).
210. Id.
211. See Abrams, supra note 50.
212. Under the equality principle rationale, sexually explicit photographs in the workplace,
if found to affect a term, condition, or privilege of employment, could be sex discrimination
only if an employer prohibited the posting of photographs portraying one sex while allowing
the posting of photographs of the other sex. In fact, the plaintiff in Robinson presented
evidence showing that JSI employees displayed only pictures of nude women. One employee
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Liberal feminists defend this analysis by arguing that a focus on
women's differences-especially their sexual vulnerabilities-brands
women with stereotypes that hinder, rather than facilitate, equality.213
EEOC v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 214 illustrates the potential harm of
"enshrining gender stereotypes at the core of Title VII."215 Sears,
charged with discriminating against women, successfully argued that
women were underrepresented in high-paying sales positions because
men's and women's work interests and aspirations regarding work
were different. Women, experts testified, were not interested in the
competitive, high-powered, high-risk commission jobs. The court's
acceptance of this argument, according to one writer, pits "gender
discrimination plaintiffs against stereotypes in a battle the stereotypes
are designed to win." '216
In Robinson, where women's reactions to sexually explicit
imagery are concerned, the divergence between the liberal feminist
equality view and the more radical assumptions of dominance theo-
rists takes on an added dimension. Liberals argue that the radical
feminist analysis of pornography as domination ignores the power
that women have to define themselves and create their own images as
skilled and professional women. 217 They argue that women have an
interest equal to their male counterparts in controlling and expressing
their own sexuality, untethered by state-imposed policies. Dominance
theorists respond that "sexuality itself is a social construct. '218
New feminist scholarship has emerged that proposes frameworks
for analyzing sex discrimination which reconcile the limits of the
equality principal with the realities of women's experiences in the
workplace.219  Kathryn Abrams, for example, has proposed an
stated that if he encountered a calendar with a picture of a nude man he would "probably
throw such a calendar in the trash." Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1494. Another employee
stated that if any vendor distributed a calendar of nude men, "he would think the 'son of a
bitch' was 'queer.'" Id
213. See Wendy W. Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment!
Special Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1985).
214. 628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff'd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988).
215. See Joan C. Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REV. 797 (1989). Williams
contends that "[i]nstitutionalizing a correlation between gender and sex necessarily reinforces
gender stereotypes and the oppressive gender system as a whole." Id. at 802.
216. Id.
217. See WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP, supra note 25.
218. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 198
(1989).
219. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829
(1990) (developing "positionality" as a stance toward knowledge from which a number of
"apparently inconsistent feminist 'truths' make sense"); Ruth Colker, Feminist Consciousness
and the State: A Basis for Cautious Optimism, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1146 (1990) (suggesting an
approach that focuses on women's well-being rather than women's subordination); Ruth
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approach that combines elements from both equality and dominance
theories, suggesting that there is no need for one comprehensive prin-
ciple of antidiscrimination law.220 Drawing upon various legal
frameworks, she argues, better "reflects a society in which women are
both juridically, aspirationally equal and shaped by distinctive exper-
iences and norms that many social institutions devalue or dismiss. "221
Robinson both draws upon and contributes to these efforts of
scholars to reconcile the equality principal and dominance theory. It
does so by requiring a concrete showing of male dominance, within
the environment in question, before allowing a presumption that sex-
ual photographs affect women differently than men. The opinion's
emphasis on this inquiry into whether a pattern of male dominance
exists in the workplace, job, or industry gives credence to a wide
range of women's attitudes toward sex and sexuality, but also recog-
nizes that women's social position relative to men affects their reac-
tions to and attitudes about sex-at least within the workplace. By
stressing the male dominance factors, Robinson avoids the assumption
that Playboy pinups will harass every woman in all workplaces, and
that all women need protection from sexual expression. At the same
time, it does not disregard the powerful impact on women of an envi-
ronment that combines male power with a constant reinforcement of
women as primarily sexual beings.
The impact of male dominance, with its concomitant power to
create the workplace environment in its own image and define that
environment as neutral, must not be lost in the discussion of how and
whether women react to sex, sexual expression, and sexual imagery.
A comparison to employer speech in the labor context is again apt.
Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1003 (1986) (arguing that courts should analyze equal protection cases from an
antisubordination perspective); Christine A. Littleton, Equality and Feminist Legal Theory, 48
U. PiTt L. REV. 1043, 1059 (1987) (suggesting that although theories of sex discrimination,
gender oppression, and sexual subordination often clash, they are potentially complementary,
and that "in making claims on behalf of women, we need to use the full arsenal of feminist
legal theory"); Christine A. Littleton, Reconstructing Sexual Equality, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1279
(1987) (proposing that courts replace the judicial model of equality as assimilation by women
to male structures with a model of equality as acceptance); Diana Majury, Strategizing in
Equality, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 321 (M.A. Fineman & N.S. Thomadsen eds.,
1991) (describing an inequality-based strategy to reconcile the equal treatment model and
women's difference models); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L. REy.
617 (1990) (suggesting that a promising response to the "difference dilemma" is an analysis
that asks whether "legal recognition of gender distinction is likely to reduce or reinforce
gender disparities in power, status, and economic security," an approach that demands
feminists acknowledge both distinctiveness and commonality between the sexes).
220. Abrams, supra note 50, at 1191-97.
221. Id. at 1192.
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As NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. 2 22 pointed out, a speech about the
evils of unionization has a vastly different impact when given by an
employer to workers before a union vote, than when delivered by a
political candidate to voters before a senatorial election. Because of
the power dynamic at play between speaker and listener, workers hear
a threat, whereas voters hear a platform. Likewise, a sexual photo-
graph has a different impact on a woman who is secure, powerful, and
accepted in her workplace than it does upon a woman at the low end
of the hierarchical totem pole, or a female pioneer in a traditionally
male-dominated field, or a woman who is a gender rarity in her job or
work environment. It is for these women that it is essential to push
beyond formal equality and fully realize the potential of Title VII. It
is for these women that the Robinson opinion holds such promise.
VI. CONCLUSION
A decision in the Robinson appeal that workplace expression in
violation of Title VII nevertheless enjoys First Amendment protection
would have significant-and detrimental-implications for the future
of sexual harassment law, and for women in male-dominated work-
places. It would unnecessarily upset the balance of rights and obliga-
tions between employers and employees established by Title VII. An
employer's assertion of First Amendment rights in a sexual harass-
ment case-whether mounted in its own behalf or on behalf of its
employees-reduces to little more than an assertion of employer con-
trol over what employees may say in the workplace. Why should
employees' statutory rights to a harassment-free work environment be
subordinated to employers' rights to impose whatever speech policies
they want in the workplace?
If upheld, Robinson will set important precedent not only by
stopping short the First Amendment defense in sexual harassment
cases, but by providing an analysis for hostile environment sex dis-
crimination with the potential to transform workplace norms, espe-
cially in traditionally male-dominated trades. Robinson, properly
read, provides an evidentiary link-sex-role stereotyping-between
sexual photographs and the finding of a hostile environment. That
link does not exist every time a salacious photograph appears in a
workplace, but depends instead upon an evaluation of the photo-
graphs within the particular workplace context. When the workplace
ratio of men to women, the positions of women within the workplace
hierarchy, and the traditional role of women within the workplace or
222. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
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occupation reveals a pattern of male dominance, courts may infer that
pinup posters and the like stereotype woman as sex objects. Because
such stereotyping burdens women and not men, it creates a hostile
environment for women within the meaning of Title VII, and the
photos that create the discriminatory environment may be eliminated
from the workplace.
Fears that the Robinson holding rests on a dangerous characteri-
zation of women as in need of protection from sexually explicit mate-
rial are unfounded. Robinson is particularly sensitive to opening
workplaces and jobs to women, not closing them. Robinson rests its
finding of discrimination not on women's differences, but on women's
lack of power within a particular social context. Likewise, civil liber-
tarian fears that Robinson will allow courts to dictate workplace decor
and decorum are misplaced. The Robinson holding is limited and
contextually based. Moreover, the fear of the sterile, colorless work-
place is eclipsed by the concern of women that the employment doors
opened formally by Title VII may now be slammed shut by a view of
sex discrimination that ignores the experiences of women in the work-
place, and by a First Amendment edict that favors majoritarian tastes
and attitudes that keep women out of traditionally male workplaces.
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